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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
At the “beginning of 1940 the United States was being 
enveloped In a rising spiral of general Inflation generated 
from two separate but related sources. In the first place, 
monetary or fiscal inflation resulted because the Federal 
Government converted its deficits into currency and bank 
deposits to provide itself with funds for defense and war 
expenditures* Secondly, commodlty-priee inflation resulted 
because the demand for civilian goods exceeded the supply 
when American industry converted from the manufacture of 
consumer goods to war materials, and in addition money be­
came relatively plentiful because of the increase in produc­
tion and income.^ The vast money supply and bank deposits 
created by Government war financing which had increased
Commodity-price inflation and monetary inflation 
are related because scarcity of commodities, with the volume 
and circulation of money remaining the same, causes prices 
to advance. 'Furthermore, large issues of money mean high 
prices because the law of supply and, demand applies to money 
as it does to every other commodity. When there is too much 
money in relation to the volume of goods and services to be 
exchanged, prices rise. In 1940 the increase in deposits 
and currency caused by defense financing, and the shortage 
of civilian goods as the result of an increase in Federal 
Government purchases of consumer goods, accentuated the 
pressures of inflation on the American economy.
Edwin W. Kemmerrer, The ABC of Inflation (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1942)7 pp. 7-14.
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demand and purchasing power, were held in check during the 
war "by an elaborate harness of controls consisting of price 
and wage ceilings, the excess profits tax, savings “bond 
drives, regulation of consumer and security credit, and 
other Government regulations#2 The cessation of hostilities 
and the subsequent return to a peacetime economy at the end 
of 1945 confronted the Federal Government with the tremendous 
problem, of keeping the forces of inflation under control.
X* PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study, devoted to postwar inflation in the United 
States and proposals to control or retard inflation, Is made 
with the purpose of finding answers to the following ques­
tions *■
(1) Were the general credit control powers of the 
Federal Reserve System adequate to prevent or substantially 
retard inflation during the postwar period?
(2) What measures would effect a shift of bank-held 
Government securities to less inflationary holders, and what 
would the effect have been in retarding inflation during the 
postwar period?
%arr!ner Eccles, Hearings'Before the Joint Committee 
on jthe Economic Report. 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, 
(Washington, D. C*: United States Government Printing Office,
1948), p. 136.
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(3) How would a combination of anti-inflationary 
measures, to be suggested later in the study, have assisted 
in reducing inflationary pressures?
It is impossible to cover the large and complicated 
field of both monetary and commodity-price Inflation within 
the scope of this study. The answers to these questions, 
therefore, will concentrate on the monetary aspects of infla­
tion.
With this limitation, the problem becomes a study of
(1) the measures conceived by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System in 1946 to combat postwar Inflation;
(2) the anti-inflation suggestions proposed in 1946 by two 
well-known economists and professors at Harvard University, 
Sumner Slichter and Alvin Hansen; and (3) a combination of 
the best proposals of the Board and the economists, in addi­
tion to measures proposed by the writer. An attempt is then
made to appraise the effectiveness of such a program if it
had been adopted by the Government in 1946.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
The remainder of this study is organized as follows:
Chapter II serves to set the background of the problem 
by recounting the evolution of the Federal Reserve System's 
policies through 1945 and the expansion of the economy during 
World War II.
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Chapter III describee the attempt of the (fovemmeht 
’ to prevent inflation from 1946 through 1948.,
Chapter XV is devoted to the followingJ
(1) An analysis of the Federal Reserve's proposals 
. to combat Inflation in 1946.
(2) An analysis of the anti-inflationary programs sug­
gested by Professors Bumrer Bldohier and Alvin Hansen of 
Harvard University in 1946.
Chapter V is a study of the effectiveness of an anti- 
inflationary program consisting of measures selected from 
those covered in Chapter IV and additional measures suggested 
by the writer.
Chapter VI summarizes the study and states the con­
clusions •
i
CHAPTER II
— DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT CONTROL, 1913-1945
Much has been written about the evolution of Federal 
Reserve policy since its origin in 1913; and only a brief 
review of the development of its major instruments of credit 
control will be undertaken here. The Federal Reserve System 
during its brief existence has operated through two World Wars, 
an unprecedented boom, a major depression, short sudden panics 
in 1921 and 1937» and the current high price and expansion 
period.
I. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RESERVE CREDIT 
CONTROL INSTRUMENTS, 1913-1939
The original principles drafted by the authors of the 
Federal Reserve Act are: "the establishment of Federal Reserve
Banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of re­
discounting commercial paper, and to establish a more effective 
supervision of banking. "**“ The predominant view of the founders 
of the Act was that control of the discount operations would 
be a major factor in exercising a constant steadying influence 
on credit conditions in the American economic system.^
^Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency« 
United States Senate, <>3rd Congress, 1st Session, 1913> Vol. 1. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1913), p* 6.
0Karl R. Bopp, "Three Decades of Federal Reserve Policy, 
Federal Reserve Policy (Baltimore, Md.: Waverly Press, 1947),p. 2.
Discount Rate Control. The Committee of Governors 
was authorized to set the rate at which commercial paper 
could be discounted at Reserve Banks, and therefore, create 
the need to expand and contract credit. Increasing the cost 
of discounts presumably discourages unhealthy expansion and 
decreasing the cost presumably encourages expansion of credit. 
When they raise the rates, member banks earn less on their 
notes if they discount them at the Reserve Banks, and they 
will be less likely to discount paper. The reverse of this 
procedure, lowering rates, allows for better earnings. How­
ever, the initiative to discount more paper comes entirely 
from the member banks.^
The first use of the discount rate as a measure of 
control of the money market was in 1920 when the Reserve BankB 
raised the rate from 4^ per cent to 7 per cent on rediscounted 
notes. This was considerably higher than the customer-bank 
rate, but approximately 1 per cent lower than the prevailing 
open market rate on prime commercial paper. This program 
assisted deflation slightly during the latter half of 1920. 
After 1921, however, the Board failed to enforce penalty rates 
to make borrowing from central banks unprofitable, and bank 
credit expansion was not retarded.^
^Lorie Tarshis, The Elements of Economics (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1947), P • 309*
^Samuel Harris, Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy. 
Vol. 1, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933), 
pp. 40-42.
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During the early and middle 1920*s the discount rate 
fluotuated from to 5| per cent and the total amount of 
bills discounted at .the Reserve BankB ranged from 1,797 mil** 
lion dollars In 1921 to 442 million in 1927- In early 1929 
there occurred a period of rapid expansion of credit accom­
panied by overspeculation in the security market and the 
discount rate was raised to 6 per cent to help effect this 
booaw With the subsequent rapid liquidation and unsettled 
business conditions the discount rate was reduced from 5 per 
cent in November 1929 to a low of l| per cent on May 8, 1931*^ 
This reduction did not encourage the banks to expand their 
loans because of the abnormally high volume of excess reserves 
held at the reserve banks. The amount of discounted paper 
declined to 7 million dollars in 1935 and remained at that 
low and insignificant level through 1939*^ Rediscounting had 
little significance as a controlling factor of bank lending 
by the Reserve System during the latter half of the 1930’s 
because of the large amount of excess reserves of member 
banks, and it has ceased to be an effective method of control­
ling bank lending.
         tmmmwmv* ■ i
^Rudolph L. Weissman, The New Federal Reserve System 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Inc., 1936), pp• 155-158.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 26, No. 2, (Washington^. 
D. C., United States Government Printing Office, 1940),. p. 120.
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Open Market Operations* To supplement the discounting 
operations In the exercise of a steadying influence on credit 
conditions the Committee of Governors was to determine the 
open market operations1 of the Reserve Banks. The open market 
operations objective is to buy and sell Government securities 
.and other obligations in the open market to affect member 
banks1 lending ability. The Reserve Banks buy and sell secur- 
ities to and from the public or, member banks* When they buy 
In the market from member banks it has the effect of enlarging 
the reserves of member banks at the Reserve Banks and increases 
their ability to lend, but if the purchases are made from the 
public the member bank's deposits grow correspondingly to the 
amount of the deposit at the Reserve Banks. They are furnished 
additional reserves, but not as large as when the purchases 
are direct from member banks, because member banks’ deposits 
as well as reserves are increased. The contraction of loans 
can be. accomplished by the sale of securities to member banks 
or individuals resulting in the reserve at the Reserve Banks 
being decreased and forcing the member banks to call in their 
loans, or refuse to renew loans, or liquidate investments to 
meet the deficit at the Reserve Banks.? Thus the actual re­
serves can be affected by the open market operations as 
determined by the Committee. Their policies also affect the
?Tarshls, op* clt., p. 30?.
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amount of money in circulation* increasing it when they buy 
securities, and decreasing it when they sell securities..
The open market operations as first followed by the 
Governors Committee was an unimportant part of the credit 
policies of the Reserve Banks. Until 1922 securities were 
purchased for their earnings only, however, in 15ay 1922 a 
Conference of Governors of the Reserve Banks adopted a “policy 
of buying and selling Government obligations in an orderly, 
systematic way, not solely with the regard to earnings, but 
with regard to the whole credit situation and to the interest 
of the Treasury."®
Open market operations and rate policy wore thus made 
coordinate instruments of Federal Reserve policy* This new 
policy of the Reserve 3ystem was to exercise Its influence 
toward restraint at times when business and speculative acti­
vity appeared excessive, and to remove credit restraint at 
times of business depression, in the hope that the policy 
might aid in avoiding the extremes of business expansion and 
contraction and encourage greater business stability.^
In 1926 the committee ordered the buying of securities 
on the open market to stimulate business; at this time banks 
were increasing their loans because of business expansion.
®Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 8, Ho. 5, (Washington,
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 340.
9Bopp, op. clt., p. 8.
Early in 1928 the committee became alarmed at the expansion 
of bank credit and reversed its 1926 policy by having the 
Reserve Banks rapidly sell their holdings in the open market. 
This had the effect of tightening the money market and forced 
the member banks to rediscount their paper at the Reserve Banks 
to replenish reserves. Securities held by the Reserve Banks 
declined by approximately 400 million dollars and by August 
1928 signs of restraint in lending were in evidence; the up­
ward swing of security prices and brokers' loans were temporar­
ily checked, therefore, the sales of securities by Reserve 
Banks was retarded.
The Reserve Banks increased their security holdings in 
January 1929 only slightly, because the committee feared it 
would add incentive to the runaway market if they bought secur­
ities in large quantities.10 Then, in February, the committee 
tried to use moral suasion to halt speculative loans member 
banks were making. However, cheap money for industry continued 
to be loaned in conflict with the tight money market held 
against speculative loans. President Herbert Hoover, in an 
effort to help the moral suasion policy of the Reserve Banks, 
sent Henry M. Robinson, a lawyer-banker and a member of the 
Presidents Economic Stabilization Conference, to call person­
ally on all the important and Influential bankers in the 
country. He requested them to use self restraint to force
10Harris, pp. cit., Vol. II, pp. 515-520.
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contraction in the expanding industrial loan and speculative 
security m a r k e t T h e  committee could not force the lower­
ing of excess reserves by selling securities in the open market 
because it held such a small amount of securities that the 
impact of selling them would have been very slight* It had 
sold most of its securities to assist in retarding the expan­
sion in the latter part of 1923 and held less than ITT million 
dollars of securities on March 2T, 1929*12
Suddenly on October 29, 1929, the market collapsed and 
speculative loans were called. Stock-market credit had reached 
the astounding sum of 12 billion dollars, and only the quick 
action of the Reserve Banks through their rapid purchase of 
securities totaling approximately 300 million dollars permit­
ted the member banks to temporarily assume the heavy indebt­
edness in the brokers1 loan market. This easy credit policy 
was continued in 1930, its objective being to provide member 
banks with sufficient funds to repay their indebtedness to 
the Reserve Banks. The Reserve officials attached importance 
to the volume of member bank indebtedness, and the purchase 
of securities by the Reserve Banks was intended to relieve 
member banks from debt and permit them to adopt a more liberal 
lending and Investment policy. The Reserve officials assumed
-^Kugene Lyons, Herbert Hoover, Our Unknown Bx-Presl- 
dent (Carden City, Y. Y . ftoufcleSay Co•, 1943) , p. 239*
12Harrls, og. cit., pp. 519-522.
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that member banks would not hold reserves in excess of legal 
requirements but would repay borrowings from Reserve Banks 
and then expand their excesses into profitable earning assets 
by expanding their loans. By the middle of 1933, over 5 bil­
lion1 dollars had been lent or borrowed by the Reserve Banks 
and member bank indebtedness had been eliminated.^
The Banking Act of 1933 established the direct action 
policy of the System and envisioned the exercise of powers 
through control over the uses which Reserve Bank credit was 
put by member banks directly or indirectly and dealt exclus­
ively with operations to which banks were a party. The Act 
prohibited member banks from acting as agents of non-banking 
lenders in making security loans to brokers and dealers. 
Purchases of securities and a new principle, that of direct 
lending, which authorized Reserve Banks to lend directly to 
industrial or commercial businesses that could not obtain 
financial assistance from the usual sources, was begun in 
1934 by the Reserve Banks to accelerate the recovery program.1^ 
The easy money market policy was continued through the 
middle of 1937 and no additional securities were purchased.
In June 1937 the Reserve Banks resumed purchasing securities 
on the open market to facilitate a quick recovery from the
•^Bopp, op* city. . p p . 12-14.
“̂ Federal, Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 19, No. 6, (Washing­
ton, D. C.: United States1 Government Printing Office, 1933), 
pp. 385-339*
sudden recession which occurred during the first part of the 
year*' ■ By the end of December'1939, the Reserve Banks held . 
in their possession approximately 2,500 million dollars of 
Government securities, the largest amount in their history*^
Reserve Requirements of Member Banks * The 'Changing, 
of reserve requirements against demand and time deposits as 
a method of alt©ring actual'and excess-reservesf and thus 
affecting member banks* ability to lend, has been used spar­
ingly by'the Reserve officials during the Reserve System is 
exist©nee* 'the Federal Reserve Act, as originally passed, 
provided for the gradual withdrawal of legal reserve money 
fro© deposit in the banks of reserve and central reserve 
cities* All such deposited legal reserves were to be with­
drawn by November 16, 1917, which was three years after the 
date, of the inauguration'of the 'Federal He serve System*- This 
legal reserve of the member banks was to be held in the vaults 
of the member banks or In the Federal Reserve Bank,, or in 
both, at the option of the member banks.16 However, the 
amendment' of June 21, 191? 'required each member bank to main­
tain its legal reserve in the form of a deposit at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of its district, and it set the-reserve require-
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940, op. eit., p. 123.
^Bearings Beforethe Committee on Banking and Currency 
United 'States Senatef. 63rd 'Congress, 1st Session,. 1913, Vol.. 1 
op. oit** p.- 16.
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ments against net demand deposits at 13* 10, and 7 per cents 
for central reserve city, reserve city, and country banks 
respectively, and 3 per cent on time deposits for all member 
banks
Reserve requirements were not altered again until Aug­
ust 1936, and they were changed only four times from August 
1936 to January 1940. The requirements were at their maximum 
ratios from 1917 until 1935 when the Banking Act of that year 
permitted the requirements to be doubled to 26, 20, and 14 
per cents for central reserve city, reserve city, and country 
banks respectively on demand deposits, and 6 per cent for all 
member banks on time deposits. On Hay 1, 1937* the reserve 
requirements for all member banks were increased to their max­
imum ratios permitted by the Banking Act to adjust to "a changed 
reserve situation brought about through the extraordinary inflow 
of gold from abroad
The reserves were large and well distributed so that 
all but a relatively small number of member banks were in a 
•position to meet the increased requirements either by utiliz­
ing their excess reserve balances with the Reserve Banks or 
by drawing upon their excess balances with correspondent 
banks.
^Tfelter 3. Kemmerrer, The ABC of the Federal Reserve 
System (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,’ 1922),
pp.~36-37.
•^Bopp, op. cit., p. 16.
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A sudden break in the stook market occurred during 
the early part of 1937 and eliminated the gains the stock 
market had made from its depression depths of 1933• The 
policy of contraction forced upon banks and security markets 
by action of the central banking authority during 1936 and 
1937 was considered by a few writers to have been a major 
factor in causing the recession during the early part of 1937* 
However, according to Alvin H. Hansen, Professor of Political 
Economy at Harvard University, raising reserve requirements 
and the imposition of stock-market margin requirements were 
only minor factors in influencing the break in the security 
and commodity markets and the recession that resulted in 1937* 
The recovery to begin with, according to Professor Hansen, 
was a peculiar one based on a rise in consumption instead of 
expansion of investment* The depression had restrained many 
people from buying durable goods, and the improved psychology 
following the banking and monetary reforms during 1933» 1934,
and 1935> combined with the need for replacement because of
* <
decreased inventories, released an accumulated backlog of con­
sumers1 demand for durable goods* This demand was financed 
largely by an expansion of installment credit* Thus it was 
consumption, not investment, which led the way toward revival 
after 1933 This recovery rested almost exclusively on a
19Alvin H. Hansen, "The Consequences of Reducing Expend­
itures,1 Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science. Vol.
17, No. 4, (Mew York: Academy of Political Science, Columbia
University, 1938), pp. 468-470*
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rising tide of consumption, "moved forward under the stimulus 
of an expanding consumer demand fed by (a) consumer©1 Install- 
mont credit supporting purchases of automobiles and other 
durable consumers1 goods, and (b) governmental expenditures#"20
Thooa two stimuli ceased* first* when the Government 
stopped pumping funds into tho oconosy, and second* when tho , 
consumer durable market financed by installment credit became 
saturated# The result was that consumption tapered off* there­
fore, new investment and expanding investments were no longor 
urgent and business refused to make any committments beyond 
its immediate requirements because of tho fear of overexpan- . 
sion#21 This chain of deflationary offeots was reflected in 
tho security and commodity markets by the break that occurred 
in the early port of 1937*
The Federal Reserve System assisted in the program to.
halt the recession by purchasing securities in the open mar-.
ket, lowering margin requirements on stock-market cradit, and
reducing reserve requirementa to 22|, 1?^* and 12 por cents
on demand deposita and 5 per cont on time deposits* Tho re­
ppquirementa remained at these percentagoa through 1939*
^Alvin H. Hanson* "What Causes a Business Downturn," 
The How Republic, Vol* 96, Ho* 384, February 2, 1938, p. 384*
21hoe* Sii*r P* 384.
2gFederal Hoserve Bulletin. Vol* 25» Ho* 2, (Washing- . 
ton, D# C.s United States Government Printing Office, 19381,
P # 120«
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Stock-Market Margin Regulrements* Discount rate con­
trol, changing reserve requirements, and open market operations 
are general Instruments of national credit policy, and are 
distinguished from selective Instruments, such as regulation 
of speculative credit and control of consumer credit, by the 
fact that their primary and principal impact is on the total 
amount of credit that is put to use in the economy, while the 
selective instruments * impact is on the amount that is put to 
use in a particular sector of the economy*2**
Legislative concern respecting stock-market credit was 
registered in 1913 by the provisions of the original Federal 
Reserve Act which declared notes drawn for the purpose of 
trading in stocks to be ineligible for discount. Direct con­
trol of speculative credit was not authorized until the 
Security Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Federal Reserve Board 
a mandate to issue margin-requirement regulations "for the 
purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the 
purchase or carrying of securities/'2^ The authorization 
was strengthened by making these regulations applicable, not 
only to all banks, both member and nonmember, but also and
2^Carl E* Parry, "Selective Instruments of National 
Credit Policy,” Federal Reserve Pollcy (Baltimore, Md.; Wav- 
erly Press, 1947),p* 65*
pAJudicial Decisions of the Security Exchange Act of 
1934. "Margin Requirements,” SeotioiTTT&T/ (Washington, D.C.: 
United States (k>vemment Printing Office, 1941)., p. LXXII.
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primarily ip extensions of credit by credit-grantor s oilier 
tban. barks# namely, by brokers and dealers in securities*
The margin requirements on "the long, side" were set 
at 26 per. cent effective October 1, 1 9 3 ^ in April 1935* 
margin requiremente were raised to 55 per cent and the ■ expan­
sion of. stock-market credit, which was serious during, the’late 
1920*8* was held within officially determined bounds during 
the unsettled period in 1936*-37* To help-relieve the reces­
sion In the latter half of 1937* requirements were lowered to 
40 per cent on "the long side*1 on November 1* 1937• Margin 
requirements in effect at the end of 1939 were 40 per cent 
on "the' long side” and 50 per cent on "the short side" for 
©took-msrket credit *
Oold Policy 1913-1939*- A problem not discussed under, 
the general or selective instruments of the Federal Reserve 
System but which influences, the expansion and contraction of 
Reserve Bank credit, concerns gold exports and imports-* The 
export and Import of gold has. caused a knotty problem to the 
Reserve System* During World far 1 gold imports expanded 
causing" Increases in member bank reserves, thus contributing
^Margin requirements on the "short side” were'not 
set until November 1, 1957# and at that time they were set 
at SO per cent*
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940#. .pp. cli*> p* 550* '
to inflation. An export balance of trade which causes gold 
to flow into the United States creates this chain of effects:
Deposit liabilities of member banks Increase; 
member bank reserves are Increased by the amount 
of the gold imported; and hence the deposit lia­
bility of the Reserve Banks are increased by this 
amount; and finally, the reserves of the Reserve 
Banks rise. When gold leaves this country the 
effects are just the opposite.2?
After the end of World War I the reverse procedure 
occurred and gold flowed from the United States as the result 
of an export balance of trade caused by the loss of numerous 
foreign war markets. In 1921 and 1922 there was a large net 
Inflow of, gold. However, In. 1922 and 1923 the sale of secur­
ities by the Reserve Banks offset part of the influx of gold 
and the expansion of the economy was not large. From 1924 
through 1927 the Board reduced rates and stimulated invest­
ment In foreign securities, and gold was drawn from this 
country. Monetary reconstruction in Europe during this period 
offered an opportunity to effect a redistribution of the gold 
supplies of the world* In 1929 European central banks sold 
their investments in New *£ork In order to protect their gold 
supplies, and the United States exported large quantities of 
gold which helped Increase the intensity of the deflation of 
the American economy.
^Tarahla. op. cit., p* 316.
In 1933 th© Gold He serve Act (1) restricted the move­
ment of gold to a Treasury function* (2) reduced the gold 
content of the dollar from 25*8 to 1 5 ^  grains of gold^ fine, 
and (3) raised the price of gold from $20*67 to $35*00 an 
ounce. This action was Immediately followed by a rapid in* 
crease In the importation of gold.2^ At the beginning of 
193^, excess reserves of member banks were approximately 765 
million dollars. With the increased flow of gold into the 
United States during the following three years, member bank 
deposits Increased, and their excess reserves Increased to 
a total of approximately 3 billion dollars at the end of 
1936.
The Board of Governors on August 15, 1936 increased 
legal reserve requirements 50 per cent, and thus reduced 
excess reserves of member banks from approximately 3*3 to 
1.8 billion dollars. However, the flow of gold imports con­
tinued during the latter half of 1936 and the Treasury Dep­
artment undertook another measure designed to lessen the 
degree of credit expansion, which would have resulted from 
these huge gold imports. The measure adopted by the Treas­
ury on December 21, 1936 to accomplish this objective was
Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Cur­
rency. United States Senate, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, 
1933, (Washington, D. C'.:, United States Government Printing 
Office, 1933), P* 5*
21
the gold sterilization program*
The gold sterilization policy was succinctly described 
by Professor Harold A. Heed as follows:
"When gold was being imported the Treasury 
would sell short-term bills and.use the proceeds 
to purchase the gold. In this way the Treasury 
would obtain the dollars with which to buy gold 
from the money market itself. The gold thus 
obtained by the Treasury became the new "inact­
ive" gold account (inactive in the sense that 
certificates were not issued' against it and de­
posited in the reserve bank) and grew to more 
than §1,400,000,000 by the middle of September, 
1937, at^which time a portion of it was dfciK&er- llized.”29
The sharp business recession which developed in the 
latter half of 1937 caused gold to be exported from the United 
States and the excess reserves of member banks decreased to 
approximately 700 million dollars. The Treasury to stimulate 
recovery released approximately 300 million dollars of its 
"inactive" gold accumulated in the-course of operation of its 
sterilization policy, therefore, the excess reserves of mem­
ber banks rose to approximately 1 billion dollars. After Feb­
ruary 1938, the United States returned to an export balance 
of trade, and gold flowed back into the country. The Treasury 
announced that "it would henceforth add newly acquired gold
29Harold A. Reed revision of Chapter XXX "Recent Devel­
opments" of a book by Louis A. Rufener, Money and Banking in 
the United States (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 193o), 
p. 777*
to its “Inactive* account only to the amount of 100 million 
dollars,'per- quarter'** Oold imports•in-oxeess of this amount 
were therefore permitted to influence member hank reserves *
■ In April 1933* the treasury.^fendoned its steriliba­
tion policy altogether* and abolished its "inactive" gold 
account by depositing gold certificates with the Reserve Banks* 
Sold imports continued to pour into the United States during 
1938* and 1939 and largely as a result of these gold imports* 
bank excess reserves rose to nearly 5*206 million dollars at 
the end of 1939*^ Or December 31* 1939V the total gold 
stock in the United states amounted to approximately, if *644 
million, dollars *21.-.
II EXPANSION OF THE AMERICAN ECONO® 1940-1945
■ the outbreak of the war In Europe in September 1959 
promised complete recovery from the depression of the 1930,e. 
However, it also presented the problem of preventing a gen­
eral inflation of the American economy. The pressures of 
monetary and commodity-prlce inflation began when the national 
defense program of the United States was financed by creating
^Rollin' d* Thomas*. Our Modern Banking and Monetary 
System {New York: Frentioe-Hall'Inc..* 'lmW> pT 331*" '
Reserve Bulletin 1940, op. cit* « p. 130*
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currency and bank deposits, and the conversion of American 
industries to the manufacture of war materials caused a short­
age of available civilian goods. The primary fiscal objectives 
to support the country’s defense policy were (1) to maintain 
relative stability in the Government security market, thereby 
assuring to the Treasury availability at low rates of interest 
whatever funds it needed, and (2) to restrict the creation 
of purchasing power to the minimum consistent with the achieve­
ment of the first objective.^2
Stability In the Government Security Market« The Fed­
eral Reserve System used its influence to help prevent a 
disorderly securities market from developing as a result of 
the European war by purchasing, late in 1940, approximately 
470 million dollars of Government securities from timid 
holders and announced that f,all Federal Reserve Banks stood 
ready to make advances on Government securities at par and 
at the discount rate."-^ This policy of the Federal Reserve 
immediately steadied the market for Government securities.
No further credit policy action with regard to the System’s 
general instruments was taken until the fall of 1941 when 
reserve requirements were raised to their maximum ratios per­
mitted by statute as a check on inflationary pressures
3%oppi 0£. clt.. p. 18.
•^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1940, op. cit., p. 1178.
generated by the national defense program.
After war was declared on December - 8* 1941I it became 
apparent that the System would have to assure that an ample 
supply of funds would be available at all times for financing 
the war effort, to assist the treasury Department in keeping 
the cost of war finance down# and help '"remove .the incentive 
that might exist for delaying purchase of Government securi­
ties in expectation of a higher yield*"54 initially, this 
involved downward adjustments of discount rates to the low 
level of 3j of 1 per cent and reduction in reserve requirements 
for banks in central money markets to 20 per cent, fhia was 
done on October 1, 1942* hater, it entailed open market oper­
ations in such volume as to provide banks with ample funds 
for meeting unusual expansion of the public*s demands for 
currency and with adequate reserves for absorbing such Govern­
ment securities as were necessary to issue but were not sold 
to non-bank investors. As a further phase of all-out assist 
banco in war finance and to assure that the cost to the 
Treasury of its expanding war debt would be kept down, the 
System adopted stabilisation of the prevailing pattern of 
Interest rates as' a primary objective of money market policy.
Between April and September 1942 the Federal Reserve 
announced its readiness to purchase unlimited amounts of
Treasury Bills at 3 per oent, Treasury Certificates of In-8
debtedness at J
10 year Bonds at 2 per cent, and the longest-term Bonds issued 
at 2^ per cent.^ The pegging of the rates on Ooverrunent 
issues caused a number of situations to develop which were 
not anticipated by the Board or the Treasury Department* The 
bankers and investors discovered their deposits and funds 
increasing, therefore they sold their short-term issues and 
invested in longer maturing issues of Government securities 
with a higher yield, and thus forced the Reserve Banks to 
become heavy purchasers of short-term Government securities 
offered on the market* The theory behind this movement was 
that the Government securities of all Issues were .liquid* 
therefore even short-term funds could be invested in long­
term Government -securities to act as secondary and Investment 
reserves, thus producing a higher yield. Another inflationary 
pressure resulted because the System lost its control over the’ 
volume of currency in circulation when it was forced to create 
new money to purchase Government securities to support the 
market.
Restricting the Creation of Burchasing Bower. To 
restrict the creation of purchasing power, which was the second
per cent, Treasury Notes at li per cent, 8 to
^Federal Reserve Bulletin; Vol. 29, No. 7, (Washington,
D.G.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), p* 590*
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primary fiscal objective of this country*s national defense 
anti-inflationary program, the Federal Government decreased 
the purchasing power of individuals and corporations and re­
duced their deposits at the banks, by drawing off their funds 
through the Defense Savings Loan drives, the first of which 
was launched on May 1, 1941.^ There were six subsequent 
drives during the war to withdraw excess purchasing power.
The purpose of these drives was to sell Government bonds to 
private corporations and individuals, with the banks being 
encouraged to buy the residual amounts of bonds not purchased 
by others. The banks had to be included in the drives to 
Insure their success if the public failed to subscribe to the 
amount of bonds issued. The purchase of bonds by the banks 
caused a greater Increase in deposit expansion and exerted 
more pressures on the expanding economy than those purchased 
by the public, because the purchase of bonds by banks converts 
Government debt into new bank deposits which circulate like 
money. The Government’s deposits are increased, but the 
deposits of individuals are not correspondingly decreased, as 
they would be if the public bought the bonds and paid for 
them from current income and accumulated savings.^
^Federal Reserve Bulletin# Vol. 27# No. 6, (Washington, 
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 609*
^Kemmerrer, ABC of Inflation, op. clt.. p. 16.
The purpose of the drives was to reduce purchasing 
power and bank deposits, not expand them. This program 
adopted during the early defense period of permitting banks 
to virtually underwrite the loan drives resulted in a serious 
obstacle to the government when the problem, during the latter 
part of the war, became that of discouraging unnecessary bank 
acquisition of Government savings bonds to retard bank credit 
from expanding to larger proportions. The sale of savings 
bonds to individuals and corporations was to have the addition­
al purpose of preventing the government from Inflating the 
economy by creating money for war financing, and thus by fin­
ancing the war from current Income additional funds would not 
have to be created.
To further reduce purchasing power, personal income 
and corporated income tax rates were increased during the 
war, and an excess profits tax on corporations was passed by 
Congress.
The expansion of consumer credit during 1940 and early 
1941 added further to consumer purchasing power, therefore, 
on August 21, 1941, the President issued Executive Order 8843, 
under the emergency powers granted to him by Congress. The' 
order authorized and directed the Board of Governors to 
exercise control over consumer credit for the duration of 
the emergency. This order gave rise to the second selective
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instrument of the Reserve System to control credit.38 The 
Board of Governors issued Regulation W effective September 1, 
1941, which limited the terms on which consumer credit was 
extended, and thereby restricted the demand for its use. Its 
purposes were, first, to restrain demand for consumer durables 
during the emergency and thus to reduce Inflationary pres­
sures on available supplies of these goods; and second, to 
restrict the overall growth of consumer credit and of consumer 
buying power during this period and thereby moderate inflation­
ary pressures in general.^9
Bank, broker, and dealer security loans, which had 
caused the security market to reach tremendous proportions in 
1929, were held in check by Regulations T and U of the Board 
of Governors during the first part of the defense period. The 
regulations in effect at the beginning of 1940 limited the 
extension of credit on securities to per cent on the "long 
side" and 50 per cent on the "short side", of their market 
value. Expansion of security credit continued during the war 
period and on July 5, 1945, margin requirements for both 
"sides" of the market were raised to 75 per cent.40 At the
3®The first selective instrument of credit control was 
Regulations T and U, which authorized the Board of Governors 
to regulate margin requirements for speculative loans by 
brokers, dealers, and banks*
•30 „Ralph Young, Federal Reserve System and Credit Con­
trol," Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 164, No. 4560, 
0 ctober 22, 1946, p . 2080.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 1946, op. pit., p. 787*
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end of 1945 security loans outstanding were less than 5*5 
billion dollars* a diminutive amount compared to the 12 MX- . 
lion .outstanding, before, the market. crash - in 1929*
Monetary Expansion During the1 War* Monetary expansion 
resulted because the■Government financed 'the war largely by 
borrowing* and one of the inevitable consequences of this 
type of financing was a rapid expansion in the supply of 
money and other liquid assets such as Government securities 
and bank deposits*
From. December 51, 1959 to December 31* 1945, the cur­
rency volume increased from 7,598 million to 28,5X5 million 
dollars. Over the five year period the country rs demand 
deposits expanded from 41,473 to 105#9^3 million dollars, time 
deposits from 27*748 to 45,473 million dollars, and the total 
money supply, including currency, time and demand deposits, 
Increased from 78,819 to 180,161 million dollars.^ In addi­
tion, gold stocks 'expanded approximately 8 billion dollars 
during this five year period and this increased bank reserves . 
and encouraged further bank credit expansion* As a result of 
this large, increase- in currency, and bank deposits Sections 
11 (e), and 16 of the Federal He serve Act were amended on
^Federal Reserve Bulletin * Vol. 32, Ho. 6, (Washing­
ton P. 0 * i United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 
p. 623*
30
June 12f 1945* lowering the gold reserve against Federal
AOReserve notes and deposits to 25 per cent*
The Treasury in this period raised a total of 390 
billion dollars# About 40 per. cent, or 156 billion of this 
amount came from taxes* Nearly 234 billion dollars was ob-I
tained from borrowing, of which 100 billion came from the 
banking system. The remainder was borrowed from individuals 
and businesses.
The war and defense periods brought about this un­
precedented expansion of the American economy which resulted 
in a spread between actual total revenue collected from all 
sources by the Federal Government and the total money expend­
ed, thereby exposing the postwar economy to the risks of 
serious instability* Chart I on the following page shows 
that the inflationary pressures which existed at the end of 
1945 were the result of war finance. Part 1 of the accompany­
ing chart shows the spread between the total 390 billion 
dollars of Government expenditures and the 156 billion dollars 
of Government tax receipts during the war and defense periods* 
This spread represents a total of approximately 234 billion 
dollars borrowed by the Treasury Department.
n Act to Amend Sections 11 (c) and 16 of the Fed­
eral Reserve Act, as amended, and for Other Purposes,” Public 
haw 84. 79th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D. C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1945), p* 1*
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fhe defend and war period increase of 22 billion 
dollars in Federal He serve holdings' of Government' •securities* 
together with a decline of over 5 billion in'excess, reserves 
of member banks ,• largely provided for the increase of appro.x* 
im&teiy. 21 billion dollars of currency in circulation.*; fhia 
increase is shown in Fart II of the accompanying chart.
From the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945 commercial 
banka, as .shown in Fart XX* .increased their holdings -of Gov­
ernment securities by approximately 80 billion dollars. During
this period the total holdings o f deposits and currency of
*
individuals and businesses increased approximately 90 billion.,
f • *
dollars., fhe inflationary potential in the expanded money 
supply is roughly indicated by the increase in its ratio to 
the annual value of the countryfs total production of all 
goods and services,, as shown in Fart- Ilf.of. the accompanying 
chart. The ratios of total deposits and currency to gross- 
national product attained aWleyel of JB per cent compared with 
less than 70 per cent at the end of 1939*
Part IV of the accompanying chart shows that Individ- • 
uals, businesses,'and insurance companies, in addition to 
having greatly expanded holdings of deposits m & currency, 
held over 90 billion dollars of Government securities at the 
end of 1945, seven time©, .a© much .as before the .war* n3avlhgs 
bonds and notes, which are more than half .of this total, are 
redeemable on. demand and* as long as the ■ Federal. Reserve
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Banks stand ready to buy the marketable securities, these 
issues also are freely convertible into cash."^ Part IV 
also shows the distribution of the holdings of 278,115 mil­
lion dollars of Government securities. The most important 
sources of monetary inflation that existed at the end of 
1945 were (a) the superabundance of money, and (b) the bank- 
held Government debt.
The superabundance of currency and bank deposits at 
the end of 1945, could be reduced only through contraction 
in public debt held by banks or by a shift In such debt from 
banks to more permanent investors; it could be further in­
creased, on the other hand, by bank credit expansion. Fur­
thermore, with the level of commercial bank holdings of market­
able Government securities $t 82.8 billion dollars, and the 
total bank holdings of marketable and nonmarketable Government 
securities at 90.8 billion at the end of 1945, it was difficult 
for the System to exercise effective control over the total 
volume of bank credit as long as these marketable holdings 
could be readily sold to the Reserve Banks* The additional 
bank reserves that could be generated at the initiative of 
banks and others could have been the basis for an expansion 
in bank credit and deposits of from six to ten times the newly 
created reserves.
4*5̂Thomas and Young, op. cit., pp. 90-97*
CHAPTER in
OTLATIOH ADD GO VERMES f BQLICY 1946-1940
In chapter II the evolution of Federal Reserve credit 
control policies and the expansion of the American economy 
during World War II were discussed* fhe present chapter will 
review the anti-inflationary measures undertaken by the Fed­
eral Government, specifically the Federal Reserve System, 
during the transition period 1946 through 1948* However, 
to review the Federal Reserve System’s and the Federal Gov­
ernment’s policies during the postwar period it is necessary 
to separate the sources of inflation into (1) monetary, and 
(2) commodity-price*
I* POSWAK MOWRPARY IIF1API0H.
In view of the monetary heritage of war finance, the 
Federal Reserve System in 1946 was confronted with the re­
sponsibility of attempting to re-establish the System's 
primary function, which was regulation of batik credit expan­
sion* However, at the same time the System had to be able 
to fulfill Its new responsibilities of assuring reasonable 
stability in the prices of the large volume of Government 
securities outstanding, and assisting the treasury in keeping 
the interest cost of the public debt as low as possible* 
Limits upon the ability of banks and others to convert Govern
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ment securities into additional bank reserves were needed 
during the postwar period, and these limits had to be im­
posed without bringing about widely fluctuating interest 
rates.
Interest Hatea and Debt Monetization. This assurance 
of stability renders long-term securities more attractive to 
bank investors and causes debt monetization. Debt monetiza­
tion results when the differential between short- and long­
term interest rates induces the holders of short-term securi­
ties to sell them and purchase longer-term, higher-rate issues. 
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve System, in order to maintain 
a stable market,-was pledged to purchase the short-term secur­
ities offered by these holders and thereby create additional 
bank reserves. It contributed to further debt monetization, 
and a further decline in long-term interest rates.
The Board of Governors in 1946 reported that:
"Such continued uncontrolled monetization of 
the debt and the subsequent decline In interest 
rates would accentuate inflationary forces in 
all capital assets. Constant downward pressure 
on Interest rates arising not from the accumula­
tion of savings but from the; creation of unneces­
sary bank credit Is not desirable under inflation­
ary conditions. Excessivev'competltIon for and 
the consequent bidding up of market prices of 
outstanding longer-term Government securities 
makes for private speculative profits and not for 
a saving to the Government. Continued declines 
In the rate structure bear most adversely upon the 
many millions of the country’s savers, upon insur­
ance companies, savings banks, endowments, trust
36
funds, and pensions.
"Instead of a further monetisation of the 
debt by the commercial banking system, public 
policy at this time would be well served if the 
banks were to sell some of their long-term hold­
ings to nonbank investors and if bank holdings 
of the debt were more concentrated in short­
term Governments which bear low rates of inter- 
eat."1
If the Board of Governors had permitted substantial 
variations in the interest rates of Government obligations It 
would have complicated the Treasury’s task of refunding its 
large maturities. However, the Board maintained a pattern of 
interest rates in which short-term rates were stabilized at 
levels considerably below long-term rates, and this was con­
ducive to further declines of long-term interest rates based 
on expansion of bank credit.
The ;maintenance of higher levels of short-term interest
/
rates would not have prevented the shifting by banks, corpora­
tions, „and others from the vast holdings of Government secur­
ities in order to meet private demands for credit, because 
these demands were particularly strong and banks were competing 
actively for such business during the postwar period. In
t
other words, If.the spread between short- and long-term inter­
est rates had been narrowed, and the shift from short- to
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 1946 (Washington. D. 0.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 4-5*
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long-term securities retarded, the higher short-term rates 
would not have prevented the sales of Govern'ent securities 
to expand private debt.
In 1946 the Treasury department and Federal Reserve 
disagreed upon policy concerning monetization of the debt.
The Board of Governors favored higher Interest rates on short­
term securities, whereas the Treasury favored low rates to 
keep the cost of carrying the debt as low as possible. The 
Board in its Thirty-Second Annual Report in June 1946 stressed 
that:
"It is possible further monetization of the 
public debt which (sic) nay need to be subjected 
to more definite restraint, if monetary policy 
is to be effective and, Indeed, if the commercial 
banks are not to induce further lowering of the 
Interest rate structure.’
At the same time Secretary of the Treasury Vinson re­
vealed (1) that the Treasury v/as committed to maintain the 
low Interest rates to hold down the cost of servicing the 
large debt, (2) that the Federal Reserve System must maintain 
a market for Government securities, and (3) low interest rates 
must be continued to stimulate production and employment.
The Treasury viewpoint prevailed and in June 1946 the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors, r. Rarriner Rcclos, recommended 
that no new measures be passed by Congress until its next ses-
2Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors 
1945, op. clt., p. 4.
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sion in 1947, and stated that, the same interest rates would 
he supported by the Federal Reserve System.^
This policy of Cow Interest rates was continued through
1946 and the first half of 194?* However, on July 2, 1947,
the Federal Open Market Committee directed the Reserve Banks
to terminate their policy of buying all Government bills
offered on the market at g per cent. The average rates bid
on weekly bill offerings rose from *376 per cent on June 28,
1947, to *740 per cent on the issue of July 24, 1947* This
move was made with the consent of the Treasury Department and
was to restore Treasury bills as market Instruments to place
some restraint on monetary expansion. By the end of December
1947, the rates rose to *950 per cent and on December 31, 1948
reached 1.155 par cent* The rates on Treasury certificates
were also permitted to rise to prevent continued debt moneti-*
nation and the percentages rose from .83 at the end of June
1947 to 1.04 on December 31, 1947, and finally to 1.22 on 
December 31, 1948. The short-term Government security market 
was bolstered after June 1947, and severe monetization of the 
debt was retarded.
Open Market Operations and Discount Rates * The general 
instruments of credit control - opeh market operations and
^’’Bankers Get a Year of Grace,” Business Week, Vol. 887, 
Ho. 28, June 22, 1946, pp. 17-18.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Washington, 
D. G.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), p* 162.
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discount rate control - were not used by the Board of Gov­
ernors because their use would have resulted in declining 
prices of Government securities,and because of the huge 
public debt outstanding and Its wide distribution* The 
Board could not counteract inflationary developments with 
its general instruments? and at.the same time fulfill its 
responsibilities for maintaining an orderly and stable mar­
ket for 'Government obligations* Banks were under some pres-r
sure during 1946 as a result of the debt-retirement program
of the Treasury»■ which forced the banks to sell short-term
securities to the Reserve Banks. Refusal of the Reserve
Banks to purchase these,securities would have resulted in an 
; 1 
increase in short-term money.rates; therefore* the Reserve
System purchased all Government securities offered on the
market and thereby maintained the low cost of carrying the
debt and supported an orderly and stable market * However,
this caused the < general instrument s of credit control to lose
their effectiveness. ■
i
Changes in Reserve Requirements. The control of reserve 
requirements was of little value in restricting bank credit 
expansion after World War II, because the ratios were at their 
maximums.in all areas except central reserve cities* Demand
%homas and young, op . eit., pp . 99-100.
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and time deposits increased during 1946 and 1947* and addi­
tional member bank reserves were required to be held at the 
Federal Reserve Banks* Finally on August 16* 1948 President 
Truman signed the anti-inflationary measure passed-by the 
Special Session of Congress which authorized the Board of 
Governors to raise reserve requirements to 30* 24* and 18 
per cent on demand deposits for central reserve city* reserve 
city, and country banks respectively, and to 7-| per cent on 
time deposits for all member banks On September 16* 1948 
the Board raised the requirements to 26, 22, and 16 per cent 
on demand deposits for central reserve city* reserve city, 
and country banks* and to 7^ per cent on time deposits for 
all member banks.7 These percentages were in effect for mem­
ber banks at the end of 1948*
Selective Controls * In view of the limitation upon 
the use of traditional methods of credit-policy under the 
changed situation brought about by the war, the only other 
measures available to the Board of Governors to restrain mon­
etary expansion during the transition period were the selective 
controls* namely* margin requirements on stock-market credit 
and the requirements for the extension of consumer credit*
a0 ^"President Signs Credit Bill" New York Times, Vol. 2Cvn
No. *August 17, 1948, p. 1*
7Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 34* No* 11* (Washington*
0. 0.; United States Government Printing Office* 1948)* p. 1115*
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Margin Requirements. The Board* to halt the specula­
tive use of hank credit and expansion of brokers* and dealers* 
loans, raised margin requirements on stock-market credit 
effective January 1, 1946 to 100 per cent. Stock-market 
credit amounted to approximately 5,729 million dollars on 
December 31, 1945, and the required full cash payment for 
listed stocks at least partially caused a decline of approx­
imately 3,238 million dollars during 1946. Credit declined 
to a level lower in relation to stock prices than prewar days, 
and in recognition of the apparent abatement of stock-market 
credit expansion, the requirements were returned to their 
1945 level of 75 per cent effective January 17, 1947*® Credit 
continued to decline during 1947 by approximately 640 million 
dollars. However, during 1948 an increase of 255 million 
occurred, and the total stock-market credit outstanding at 
the end of 1948 was 2,102 million dollars. The accompanying 
table shows the margin requirements in effect and the change 
in stock-market credit during the transition period.
TABLE X
STOCK-MARKET CREDIT
Percentage Credit Change inDate (End of Month Requirements Outstanding * Credit
December 1945 75 §5*729,000December 1946 100 2,491,000 -§3,238,000
December 1947 75 1,850,000 641,000December 1948 75 . 2,102,000 ♦ '255,000
Source: " Federal "Reserve Bulletin,' January 1958",^^* 45; and 
January 1949, p. 46.
®Federal Reserve Bulletin. Vol. 33, No. 1, (Washington 
D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 27•
Consumer Credit Requirements* The control of consumer 
credit was continued during 1946* hut after December 1, the 
control of Installment financing of major durables only was 
continued undbr Regulation W. Controls on installment credit 
were continued because they were subject to the widest range 
of expansion and contraction and contributed to business 
instabilityCongress permitted Regulation W to expire on 
November 1, 194? and during the next nine months consumer 
credit rose approximately 2*4 billion dollars, of which ap­
proximately 1.8 billion was installment financing* This 
increase prompted a Special Session of Congress on August 7, 
1948 to re-establish temporary installment credit controls 
on **hard goods” effective September 16, 1948.^ The remainder 
of the year consumer credit increased approximately 1,402 
million dollars, of which 618 million was installment credit.
TABLE II
CONSUMER AND INSTALLMENT CREDIT 
(millions of dollars)
Date (End of 
month)
Consumer
Credit Increase
Installment
Credit Increase
December 1945 6,598 2,325December 1946 10,101 3,603 3,910 1,585December 1947 12,074 1,973 5,758 1,848August 1948 14,522 2,448 7,578 1,820December 1948 15,924 1,402 8,196 618
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1949, p* 3007
9Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947, op * cit*, p# 1347*
10New York Times, August 17, 1948, op. cit., p. 1.
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Postwar Government Debt Management. This monetary
«
policy followed by the Reserve System had to be closely re­
lated to the management of the public debt by the Treasury 
Department* The Federal public debt at the end of 1945 was 
approximately 278 billion dollars, and the retirement and 
refunding had a great deal of influence on monetary devel­
opments*
At the end of 1945 the Treasury had a cash surplus of 
approximately 26 billion dollars as a result of the War Loan 
drive during October and November of 1945* During 1946 the 
Treasury withdrew approximately 22 billion dollars of War 
Loan deposits, but caused no reduction in member bank re­
quired reserves, as no reserves were required against these 
deposits. However, the retirement of public debt by drawing 
on accumulated Treasury balances caused a sharp decline in 
commercial bank holdings of Government securities during 1946, 
particularly short-term issues. The most deflationary method 
of UBlng an accumulated Treasury balance is to retire Govern­
ment securities held by Reserve Banks. This decreases the 
reserves of member banks. However, during 1946 the retirement 
of securities held by Reserve Banks was offset by Reserve
System purchases of securities in the open market. Thus little
11or no pressure was exerted on member bank reserves. The re­
duction of holdings of marketable Government securities during 
1946 is shown in the accompanying table on the following page.
^ Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Board of .Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 1947 (Washington. D. C.: United
States Printing Office, 1947), pp. *16-17.
’* - v - * •
TABIE III
MARKETABIE POBIIC DEBT OF THE ONI TED STATES 
(millions of dollars)
Changes Changes Changes
in in in
Holdings Holdings Holdings
types of Bee. 31 Boring Dec. 31 During Dec* 31 During Dec, 31
Security Holders X9kS 19U6 191*6 191*7 191*7 191*8 191*8
Federal Reserve Banks 2!*,262 - 912 23,350 - 791 22,559 / 771* 23,333
Commercial Banks 82,830 -15,868 66,692 - 5,592 61,370 -6,017 55,353
Mutual Savings Banks 10,1*91 / 1,030 11,521 / 31 H,562 - 675 10,877
Insurance Companies 23,183 / 1,163 2!*,31*6 - 1,1*51 22,895 -3,075 19,820
Others 51,01*6 - 6,869 i*lt,177 - 2,023 1*2,151* / 1*83 1*2,637
TOTALS 198,820 -22,163 176,658 , -10,867 165,791 -8,291* 157,1*97
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, March 191*6, p. 273, and March 19l*9, p. 280
#>•
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The pressure on bank credit expansion was continued 
during 1947, and approximately 10*9 billion dollars of mark­
etable Government securities was retired* The largest re­
duction occurred in commercial bank holdings of marketable 
Government securities and amounted to approximately 5#592 
million dollars. The smallest was the 791 million dollar 
reduction of Federal Reserve Bank holdings. This total 
reduction of securities was anti-inflationary Professor 
Louis Shere wrote in December 1946 that:
"'Vhile the retirement of bank-held debt 
which reduces bank deposits is generally con­
sidered more deflationary than retirement of 
of debt held by nonbankl ig public, this super­
iority depends on the rate of turnover of 
deposits which are extinguished. . . . The 
most deflationary method of using Government 
surplus is either to accumulato Treasury bal­
ances with the Reserve anks or to retire 
government securities held by the Reserve Ranks 
since either method will decrease the reserves 
of member banks. Under present requirements 
each dollar reduction in member bank reserves 
tends to result ln,a sixfold restriction of demand’ deposits."*^
The funds to retire Govemient debt came from the 
Treasury surplus secured because Government receipts exceeded
•**%he increase of 31 million dollars in mutual savings 
bank Government security holdings is not considered inflation­
ary because the mutual savings banks were permanent investors, 
and their holdings would not cause expansion in bank credit* 
One of the anti-Inflation suggestions of the Federal Reserve 
was to shift Government securities to permanent investors.
13Louis Shore, "Taxation and Inflation Control," Ameri­
can Economic Review. Vol. 38, No* 5, December 1943, p. 853*
expenditures, from the net sa3.es surplus of savings bonds and
14■notes'j and the cash available from .trust funds*
The pressure on bank credit,expansion was continued 
during the\first'half of 1 9 4 8, but in April, Congress reduced' 
the f ax rates for personal incomes * and receipts were less than 
anticipated, nevertheless, the surplus from the previous year 
in addition-to the surplus for 1948, plus the cash available 
from trust funds .of the government-, and: the net sales surplus 
of savings bonds and notes permitted fh© marketable debt to 
be reduced, approximately 8.3 billion dollars* On December>31» 
1948, It totaled 157,49? million dollars.15 Table 4 on Page 
49 shows the reduction and -distribution'of the marketable-• / 
debt for 1948.
From the monetary standpoint, the superabundance of 
money .created by wartime borrowing and the high level of in­
come flowing from production' and -employment composed part of 
the inflationary potential during the postwar period. This 
monetary inflationary pressure occurred at a time when the 
supply of goods and services available for purchase and the 
funds existing were far from ••adequate-to meet the demand, on 
which was superimposed an unprecedented backlog of demand 
accumulated during the war years*- This- was inflation potential 
from the.commodity-prlce standpoint*
-^Federal Beserve .Bulletin,. 1948, op:* cit *, p. 43*
■ 15Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 35 , No. 3, (Washington,
D. -8*-: Unit©d3tates Printing Office, 1949), p* 280*
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COJKQDITY-PRICiS INFLATION 
This commodlty-price inflation potential at the be­
ginning of 1946 was held under control by the government 
through direct measures, such as price regulation, rationing, 
and subsidy payments. Stabilization as a wartime measure was 
a necessity. However, with the end of the war there was 
opposition to restrictive measures of wage controls and scarce 
material allocation, and the stabilization program was modi­
fied in August 1945* In October and November 1946 it was 
largely abandoned. As a result of shortages of goods and of 
drastic and irregular alterations in the stabilization program, 
prices increased sharply in 1946. "The greatest Increases 
occurred in the summer of 1946 during the lapse of price con­
trols and late in autumn when controls were largely abandoned, 
but in the early part of 1947 there were were further general 
price i n c r e a s e s . However, prices leveled off during the 
second quarter of 1947, but once again they began their steady 
riso after the middle of 1947» attributed to the granting of 
the second round of wage increases. Prices continued to rise 
during 1948, and the peak was reached in August. A downward 
trend has occurred since that time.
The Economic Report of the President in January 1948
l^Thirty-Third Annual Report of The Board of Governors 
1947, o£>. cit., p. 25.
indicated the amount of the rise In wholesale and retail 
prices 'during 1946 and the early part of 194? when it stated:
l,fhe abolition of OPA raised the question 
how the economy would adjust itself to freedom 
from:price control#'' the •answer was--soon read, 
in the sharp rise In‘wholesale prices-between 
June and December 1946. This was an annual'' 
rate of almost 50 per cent, one of the steepest 
rises -ever recorded* Consumers1 prices rose at 
an annual rate_of over 30 per cent during the 
s a m e  p e r i o d * '  ^  •
the peak of the price level was reached in august 1948 
when retail prices averaged 96*3 per cent higher than'’in 
1935-39, and wholesale prices 69*5 per cent higher*3*̂
Table 4 on the following page clearly shows the changes 
in the Consumers'* Price index-and Wholesale Price index of 
the Department of labor Statistics, and the Retail Price 
Index of the Department of Commerce.
^Economic Report of the President ianuary 1948 (Wash­
ington, bT c. :' United' states Government Printing Off  i ee, 1948), 
p. 34.
^ Survey of Current Business* VOX * 29, $ 0 # 2, (Washing-*' 
ton, B. cTnSatea States Government Printing Office, 1949) , 
pp* $4*5* '•
TABIE I?
PRICE BJBEXES FOR POSTWAR PERIOD 
DECEMBER 191*5-191*8 
(averages for month)
Indexes 191*5December.' June
191*6.
Dec.' - 191*7June., . Dec. June
191*8 : .
Dec.
0. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Consumers' Prices (1935- 
1939 « 100) 129.9 133.3 153.3 157.1 167.0 171*. 5 171.1*
Wholesale Prises (1926 « 100) 107.1 112.9 . 11*0.9 . 11*8.0 ,163.2 169.5 162.2
0. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Retail Prices (1935-1939 m 100) 11*3.1 11*7.7 , 172.7 178.7. 188.1* 196.3 >92.5
Source5 Survey of Current Business, February 191*?, pp. December 19k7» pp* and
February 19h9, pp* S-U-5*
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CHAPTER IV
THE AKTI-IKFLATIOMR^ POLICIES OF THE. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
AND THE HARVARD ECONOMISTS
This chapter will bo devoted to an analysis of the 
ant 1 -1 nflationary proposals In 1946 of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System„ and Professors Sumner Sllchter 
and Alvin Hansen of Harvard University*
I. BOARD OF GOVERNORS AHTI-IRFLATIOD PROGRAM
As a result of the heritage of war finance 9 the Federal 
Reserve System was greatly restricted In its capacity to per­
form the function for which it was established» namely„ to 
oxerclso an effective control over the volume of bank credit 
and money supply. Therefore9 the primary postwar problem 
was to re-establish th© System's capacity to influence credit 
and monetary conditions in th© Interest of stable economic 
development
The Board of Governors in their Thirty-Second Annual 
Report to Congress in 1946 stated that "in retrospect It is 
evident that more vigorous policies should have been adopted 
in order to rale© more of the cost of the war through taxa-
^Thomas and Young, £2* cit*. p. 90.
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tlon and to restrict bank purchases of Government securities."2 
Banks were relied upon to a considerable extent to finance 
the war because purchases by banks were needed to help main­
tain an active security market and to facilitate the general 
sale of new Government security issues during the war*
In this connection, it may be interesting to refer to 
the conclusions reached by Professor ’71111am J. Fellner, of 
the Department of Economics of the University of California, 
in his study, Postscript on Tfar Inflation, published in 1947* 
Mr. Fellner concluded:
"That a linear (that is to say, proportional) 
income tax of about 10 per cent, applied to all 
income without exemption, superimposed upon the 
income tax structure that prevailed, would pre­
sumably have prevented the formation of any 
inflation potential* Given such a tax, and given 
the direct controls necessitated by specific 
shortages, it would not even have been necessary 
to use war bond "drives” as a further means of 
reducing the demand for goods* However, it 
would of course have been necessary to prevent 
such wage increases as might start an inflation­
ary potential**-^
Mr. Fellner also concluded that:
"There is nothing in the reasoning that could 
not be made to fit tax schemes of a different 
sort.
"A proportionate Income tax with no exemption
2Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 
op* cit*, p . 11.
William J* Fellner, "Postscripts on V7ar Inflation,” 
Amorloan Economic Review. Vol* 37# Mo. 1, 1947# P* 67*
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possesses distinctly objectionable features, 
but they all are shared by Inflation, and 
inflation possesses additional objectionable 
properties. From the point of view from which 
proportionate income tax is bad, that is, from 
the point of view of social equity, and the 
so-called ability to pay, a rise in the cost 
of living is certainly no better. * . . It is, 
however, impossible to make an equally clear- 
cut statement on whether it would have been 
"good” or "bad” to substitute proportionate 
(linear) taxes for part of the progressive 
taxes in existence, (that is to say to make 
the existing tax structure less progressive) 
or whether It would have been ’’good or ’’bad” 
to supplement the existing taxes with further 
progressive rates, (that is to say, to increase 
the progressiveness of the tax structure) '***
Mr. Fellner deduced that the inflation potential would 
have been eliminated by the 10 per cent proportionate tax 
superimposed upon the tax structure in existence during the 
war, thus avoiding the postwar rise in the price level of 
consumer goods and the general inflation of the economy.
War finance restricted the Federal Reserve System in 
its use of traditional methods of credit control to prevent 
excessive expansion of bank credit. The Reserve System had 
to assure reasonable stability in the prices of the large 
volume of Government securities outstanding and assist the 
Treasury in keeping the coat of the debt as low as possible. 
In -view of this latter limitation to which interest rate
^American Economic Review, Ibid., pp. 87-89-
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policy was subjected, a flexible rate should have been fol­
lowed by the Board of Governors at the beginning of 1946 to 
permit some variation In the spread between* and levels of, 
short- and long-term interest rates. This would have helped 
re-establish some control over credit expansion, as well as 
preventing the downward movement of long-term interest rates 
growing out of monetization of the public debt.
However, it would not have been possible to control 
bank credit expansion and debt monetization through the use 
of general or selective Federal Reserve instruments Of credit 
control. Therefore, to assure effective discharge of the 
Sybtem’s basic long-run responsibilities, additional instru- 
raents of general credit regulation would have been needed* 
These instruments would have had to re-establish the System’s 
functions along traditional central banking lines*
Proposals for Credit Control. The Board of Governors 
in their Thirty-Second Annual Report outlined three basic 
proposals for consideration by CongressJ
(1) A bond limitation plan.
(2) A secondary reserve plan.
(3) A primary reserve plan.
The Bond Limitation Plan* . This plan would have limited
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the amount of "long-term marketable securities, both public 
and private, that any commercial bank could hold against
cdemand deposits.' In other words, this plan would merely 
have extended the principal pursued during the war, of re­
stricting investment of demand deposit funds in long-term 
assets. The plan was an indirect method designed to halt 
the shifting of commercial bank.holdings from short- to long­
term Government securities* Howevex; it would not have 
guaranteed that the banks would have bought short-term Gov­
ernment securities; it probably would have encouraged bank 
lending to secure higher profits. The reduction of the 
amounts of long-term Government securities that banks would 
have been permitted to hold would have caused interest rates 
on long-term securities to drop and complicate the Treasury’s 
task of refunding its long-term issues. A decline in long­
term rates caused by pressure of credit expansion, rather than 
by a surplus of current savings over the capital demands of 
business, would have had additional inflationary influence in 
the security markets and would have been disruptive to finan­
cial processes*6
The bond limitation plan would not have stimulated 
shifts from long- to short-term Government securities; it
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 
op * cit.. pp. 7-B.
Thomas and Young, op. cit;, p. 102.
would have created th© problem of finding other investors 
for long-term securities. It would have had littie effect 
on restraining bank lending, and probably would have encour­
aged banks to lend to secure higher yields onthelr invest­
ments rather than restrain lending, which was the proper 
scope of the plan* This plan offered no guarantee that banks 
would have shifted their holdings to short-term Government 
securities in place of long-term securities. Therefore* the 
plan is not considered by the writer to be a good anti-infla­
tionary measure * and will not be included in the program to 
be discussed later in the thesis.
The Secondary Reserve Plan. This plan would have 
established a required reserve, in addition to the member 
banks1 balances with the Reserve Banks, which would have been 
held in Treasury bills or certificates equal to a specified 
percentage of net demand deposits of all commercial banks.
The Board, to facilitate transition to the secondary reserve 
plan, would have permitted the banks to hold additional re­
serve balances with the Reserve Banks or vault cash in lieu 
of Treasury bills or certificates * The reason given by the 
Board for the inclusion of this principle in the proposal was 
that it would have been necessary for the Treasury to supply 
bills or.certificates to the banks needing them to meet their 
secondary reserve requirements against expanding deposits.
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which would have resulted In 11 further pressure for bank 
credit expansion and deposit growth rather than restraint, 
which was the purpose of the plan to provide/’?
The secondary reserve plan would have permitted banks 
to retain substantial holdings of.short-term Government 
securities, while limiting their ability to sell them to the 
Reserve Banks in order to make other loans and investments; 
at the same time, it would have assisted the Treasury to main­
tain the low carrying cost of the public debt and to help 
stabilize interest yields. It was necessary to include all 
commercial banks under this plan, not just member banks of 
the Reserve System, because of the large amount of securities 
held by banks outside the System at the beginning of 1946, 
and because it \?ould have given nonmeraber banks competitive 
advantage over member banks in securing higher-yielding 
investments.
The secondary reserve plan is considered to be a more 
direct measure to insure the low cost of carrying the debt 
and in halting debt monetization than the bond limitation 
plan. Therefore, later in the thesis, the proposal will be 
included In the anti-inflationary program suggested by the 
writer. The section of the secondary reserve measure which 
permits banks to hold vault cash or excess reserves in lieu
?Thomas and Young, op. olt*. p. 115*
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of Government securities will not be included for reasons 
given above# To counteract the problem of having to supply 
Treasury bills or certificates to meet possible expanding 
deposits, a special short-term Government security presumably 
would be issued and sold to the Federal Reserve Banks, and 
the revenue secured from this assumed new issue would be used 
to retire longer-term bank-held Government securities as 
they reached maturity. Thus no further bank credit expansion 
would occur.
The Primary Reserve Plan. This plan would have given 
the Board of Governors authority to increase member bank 
reserve requirements. The principal effects of this proposal 
would have been to (1) shift certain amounts of short-term 
lower-yielding Government securities from commercial and 
member banks to Federal Reserve Banks, and (2) to reduce the 
ratio of multiple credit expansion on the baBls of a given 
amount of reserves. It would have, therefore, reduced the 
amount of short-term Government securities available for sale 
by the banks to the Reserve Banks and also reduced the degree 
of credit expansion that would have been possible on the basis 
of any reserves created by such sales. The Reserve Banks 
would have had to be heavy purchasers of short-term securities, 
thereby assisting the Treasury to support low interest rates 
on the public debt.
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The Board of Governors, In Its Thirty-Second Annual 
Report, included an unusual suggestion in the plan to increase 
reserve requirements when they reported that, "if this author­
ity is granted, banks should be permitted to count vault cash
as reserves and there should be provision for greater admin-
oistrative flexibility tin‘applying changes In requirements*1 
Walter £• Spahr, Professor of Economics at Hew York Univer­
sity, in July 1946 expressed the criticism of a number of 
economists, when he stated;
"Perhaps no harm, or possibly even benefits,
would result if Congress gave the Board authority
to raise reserve requirements of member banks 
above those now authorized*
"But why should the Board now wish to enable 
member banks to count vault cash as reserves?
After all that has been said and written by 
Reserve Boards and monetary authorities in the 
past about the virtues of centralized reserves, 
what defensible ground can this Board find for 
wishing to embark upon a program of decentrali­
zation of our reserve structure? If there is 
any sound argument to support this program, this 
author is unaware of it* .
"This report of the Board gives this author 
the impression that anything that is in vogue 
for any length of time and if accepted as sound 
is naturally suspect In the eyes of the Board.
If It is ’traditional* it is apparently, and of 
necessity bad* . . .
"The absurdity of this suggestion becomes 
even greater when it Is recalled that on June 12,
1945, this same Board persuaded Congress to ex-
®Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 
op. cit., p. 8*
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elude from the reserves of the Federal 
Reserve Banks all Treasury cash except 
gold certificates. In other words, this 
Board now proposes that Treasury (and other) 
; cash that cannot serve for reserves in the 
Reserve Banks should he counted as part of 
the reserves of member banks I One of these 
proposals is Just as Indefensible as the other.”9
The Board*s report also contained the provision that, 
"to assure effective control, all commercial banks should be 
subject to the same reserve requirement.!*10 Professor Spahr 
expressed his opinion concerning this provision of the pri­
mary reserve plan as being **sheer nonsense•” He wrote that:
!it
"Monetary authorities and past Federal 
Reserve Boards have pointed out over and over 
why commercial banks should be classified and 
not subject to the same reserve requirements.
So far as this author knows this is the first 
time that any Reserve Board since 1914 has 
discovered that such a system, so long studied 
and so long approved, is really not sound in 
principle. The present Board, in this report 
now profounds a new * truth* without providing 
any reasons for it beyond saying, that it is 
*to assure effective control.* That is, in 
the opinion .of this writer sheer nonsense.
The Board of Governors at the time of the submission 
of Its Thirty-Second Annual Report in 1946 had appointed a
i '
Committee of Federal Reserve Bank and Board Economists to
^"Federal Reserve Credit Proposals," Commercial'and 
Financial Chronicle, Vol. 164, No. 4506, July 3, 1946, p. 236.
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 
22 • d t., p. 8.
11Spahr. op. cit.a p. 236.
study the problem of hanking and credit policy cone^iing 
uniform reserve requirements for all member hanks. However* 
the Federal Reserve Bank and Board Economists1 report was 
not submitted to the Board .of Governors until April 22, 1948* 
almost two .years after1 the-Board included the -uniform' reserve 
requirement principle in its Annual Report for 1948* There­
fore* In the opinion of this writer* presumably the Board of 
Governors should not have announced this principle in 1946 
before the study and arsLysis of the Federal Reserve Bank and 
Board Economists was completed*
This report of the Committee of Beserve Bank and Board 
Economists In 1948 reached Important conclusions as to uniform 
reserve requirements* In this connection* it may be interest­
ing to refer to the suggestions which the Committee of Bank 
and Board Economists submitted to the Board of Governors in 
1948. The Committee concluded?
“The designations of■central reserve and 
reserve cities should be eliminated*
"The basic initial reserve requirements 
should be prescribed against net demand depos­
its as follows;
la) 30 per cent against interbank deposits 
whether demand or time.
(b) 20 per cent against other demand depos­
its less cash items In process of collection,
(c) 6 per cent against time deposits*
‘’The federal Open Market Committee should be 
empowered to increase or decrease these basic 
requirements to a maximum of 50 per cent*
"Vault cash should be permitted to b© 
Qounted as: part of reserve requirements *
nConsId©ration should be given to the
desirability of prescribing uniform reserve 
requirements to be observed by ail nonmember 
banks in lieu of or in addition to those 
presoribed by State law*"3*2
The primary reserve plan will be included with the - 
measures suggested by the.writer to halt or retard Inflation 
later in the study. - However*, the uniform reserve requirement 
and counting vault cash as reserves will not be Included be­
cause the intensive study required to analyze the effects Is 
beyond the proper scop© of this study.
tinue regulation of consumer credit on a permanent basis ad 
an integral part of the SystemVs function of maintaining 
sound credit conditions | (3) a retirement program aimed at 
bank-held securities and a refunding operation issuing non- 
marketable securities and redeemable before maturity only at 
a proportionately lower ret urn; and (3) to maintain the same 
tax structure in 1946 and 194?."^
12Staff Subcommittee to a Committee of Federal Reserve 
Bank and Board Economists,• "gjqgy ’of Cntform Reserve Require­
ments for all Member Banks*w {Unpublished report presented to 
the Board of (Jo v errors of the Federal Reserve By stem, Washing­
ton, X>. C., April* , April 22, 1948) , pp. 3-4.
^Thirty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Governors,
.Proposals, for .Additional Controls. The Board of Gov 
errors in Its 1945 Annual Report suggested also (1) to con- 
op . cit. p p . , 23-25.
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Consumer Credit Regulation* Consumer credit In 1946 
added to the purchasing power of individuals at a. time when, 
the economy was already overburdened with an excessive supply 
of money in relation to the available volume of goods and 
services. Regulation of consumer credit would have restrained 
excessive demands for credit by limiting the borrowing capacity 
of prospective purchasers of goods and services* Therefore, 
Regulation W will be included in the anti-inflationary program 
suggested later in this study*
Tax. Refunding and Retirement Program. The tax program 
and refunding and retiring of Government securities, suggested 
in the 1945 Annual Report of the Board of Governors would have 
had to supplement each other to be effective in combating 
postwar inflation. Federal Government receipts, if they ex­
ceeded expenditures, would create Treasury surpluses, and to 
retire Government securities from this surplus would act as a 
deflationary force upon the economy. During the postwar per­
iod the Federal debt was reduced to a limited extent by apply- 
ingftfreasury surpluses to retire maturing securities* Too 
rapid a retirement of maturing-Government securities deflates 
the economy too quickly, and would injure the economic struc­
ture. Therefore, it would have been necessary to set up a 
systematic reduction of the debt. The refunding operations 
would have had to be directed toward issuance of a non-market- 
able and nonredeemable securities, with features similar to
the Series G savings bonds which were Issued during the war 
and defense periods* except with differences as to eligibil­
ity ferpurchase* purchase limits# and maturities, they 
would-have had to be issuedj
. * • to absorb the savings of the public in 
the hands of institutional investors not being 
Invested in private outlets. The use of this 
type of security permits the Treasury to ,pay an 
‘ appropriate.rate .for genuine long-term savings 
and provides an instrument for protecting the 
income of bona fide investors while also pro­
tect ing them against capital loss in ease of 
liquidation before maturity * At the same time, 
this type of security safeguards the Treasury 
against paying a high coupon rate on liquid 
investments to temporary holders.14
•Certain measures will be suggested by this' writer to
decrease the. purchasing power ef individuals, and assist the
anti-inflationary■program proposed later in this study# and
regulation of consumer credit will be one of those measures.
The program will also involve creation of a Treasury surplus 
*
and its use to retire bank>held Government securities*
IX* AKTI-1NFLATX0MEY PEG GEM PROPOSED 
BY PROFESSOR SUMER H. SDXCHTER
On April 30, 1946# Professor Sumner Slichter, of Harvard 
University, pointed out some of the preventive measures that 
. could have been used to relieve the pressures of postwar ihfla- 
• tion* Professor ■Sliohter did not fear a general price rise
l^fhomas and Young, op. cit -, p* 110*
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was necessarily bad for the economy * However, he held that 
to keep the rise moderate, orderly* and free from speculative 
excesses was the essential objective of any antinflationary 
plan* To do this he advocated four principal steps *
(1) Limiting further increase in demand deposits*
(2) Keeping the demand for goods on the part of 
the Government to a minimum.
(3) Improving administration of OPA.
(4) Keeping production costs fro® rising rapidly—  
or better still reducing them.^5
Limit Further Increase in Demand Deposits. To limit 
the further increase in demand deposits Professor Sliohter 
suggested (a) balancing the budget, (b)*paying off part of the 
government debt held by the banks, and (c) controlling expan­
sion of bank credit.
If a Treasury surplus could be secured during the post­
war period, he suggested that the retirement of the part of 
the debt held by banks would reduce der.and deposits , thereby 
relieving inflationary pressures. However, if a deficit 
occurred as a result of Government expenditures exceeding re­
ceipts during the postwar period, this deficit would have had 
to be financed to a considerable extent by further expansion 
of bank credit, thus increasing Inflationary pressures. A 
deficit, if directly financed out of real savings rather than
15sumner Slichter, nThe Threat of Inflation/1 Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle. Vol. 163, No. 4486, May 2, 1946, pp* 
23%, 2390-91*
bank loans , would not load to an expansion of bank deposits* 
■Therefore, to prevent the Treasury deficit from increasing, 
Professor Blichter opposed a reduction of taxes during 1946 
and 194?.
Professor Sltchter also stressed that, "bank credit 
which finances the accumulation of inventories or which flnan* 
ces consumption is just as inflationary as bank credit which 
finances government deficit#” Therefore, he advocated the 
regulation of consumer credit because it financed consumption 
and was inflationary#’-
Keep the Demand for Poods on the Part of the Government 
to a Minimum # Professor Slichter’s second principal proposal 
was that state, local, and national governments should post­
pone all public works.which were not urgently needed, so long 
as danger or a disorderly rise in prices was acute. He sug­
gested allocation of scarce building materials to prevent 
residential building from being hampered by unimportant public 
works during the transition period.
Price Regulation. The third step proposed by Profes­
sor Slichter involved improving the administration of OPA.
He wrote that:
wBorne businessmen have asked for an immed­
iate termination of OPA except in certain fields, 
such as rent, this, in my -judgment, would be un-
l6Sl.tehte3?» Ibid., p. 2390.
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wiBe. It would require business to assume 
responsibility for preventing a disorderly 
rise In prices before business is able to 
assume that responsibility.”1?
Professor Sllchter predicted a rapid rise in the gen- 
eral price level of the economy as the outcome of early 
termination of price controls* He suggested that OPA bo 
continued during the postwar period but improved specifically 
by modifying the conception of the objectives of price con­
trol* He believed that price control during the postwar 
period should not keep prices at the 1946 level* but permit 
them to rise gradually and orderly, until OPA could be term­
inated without causing a rapid rise in prices. A cost-price 
relationship would have to be the aim of price regulation, 
and the improved administration of OPA would also have to 
aim at a better balance of prices*
Reduce Production Costs * The final principal pro­
posal to retard inflation was considered by Professor 
Sllchter to be the most important element in price control. 
“Unless,” wrote Professor Sllchter, “labor efficiency can 
be.increased fast enough to prevent future wage increases 
from forcing price increases, the country will involve it­
self in a spiral of wage-prlce advances. The only real pro­
tection against rising wages bringing about higher labor 
costs and a spiral of price-wage advances is an Increase in
i7Slichter, Ibid.. p, 2390.
output per man h o u r T h i s  prediction foresaw the outcome 
of the wage-prlce spiral that has occurred in the American 
economy during the postwar period* r Paring the transition 
period from 1946 through 1948, management and labor failed 
•to-have ''enough interest in long-range planning of wage-cost-, 
price 'relationship .to help prevent a commodIty-price infla­
tionary spiral- labor, in 1946* demanded and received 
Increases in wages that permitted the take-home pay of the 
postwar shorter work week to equal the high'weekly earnings 
of the'.premium-paid wartime period. At the asm© time, man­
agement demanded and secured the elimination of direct con- 
troia of prices and' materials because they believed, the 
controls were hindering industry in increasing production* •
Wages and prices began spiraling upward in 1946 and 
.new wage Increases were granted in 194? based upon the increased 
price level'and the cost of living. As prices rose and in­
creased the cost of living, wag©’earners exerted.additional 
pressures for further wage Increase’s and management, increased." . 
prices to meet ■the increased wage cost when the increases were 
granted# Thus developed the upward wage-price spiral of the 
postwar period.
Combination of Measures to Prevent Price Inflation*
Professor Sllchter concluded that a successful program
l8Slichter, S M d >, p. 2391.
68
to control prices required a combination of these policies 
to prevent a disorderly rise in prices. He wrote that:
"Government expenditures need to be kept 
down, taxes need to be kept up, banks need to 
avoid pushing the expansion of consumer credit, 
price controls need to bo continued (though on 
a more liberal basis), business managers need 
to hasten improvements in methods of produc­
tion, trade unions need to refrain from pres­
sing demands which increase money wages without 
increasing real wages, and need to do what they 
can to increase output per man h o u r . " 1 ^
The suggestions of Professor Sllchter to combat price 
inflation call for direct and selective measures. However, 
he would leave the prevention of bank credit expansion upon 
the good sense and foresight of the bankers themselves. If 
price inflation were controlled by direct and selective meas­
ures, It is the opinion of this writer that monetary infla­
tionary pressures should also be controlled by direct or 
selective measures to assist the commodlty-prlce inflation 
control. Monetary and oommodity-price inflation are related 
and the controlled reduction of monetary sources of inflation 
will supplement commodity-price inflation control. Therefore, 
it is better to be able to direct contraction of monetary 
pressures than to leave them to the good sense and foresight 
of the bankers. Professor Sllchter considered the monetary
19Slichter, Ibid.. p. 2391.
anti-‘■Inflationary .program suggested by toe Board: of Governors 
in its 1945 Annual Report as too drastic- and he eon. si dor ed it
possible that it would have' resulted in inflationary' rather
. •» ■ 20than'deflationary effects upon, the economy.
t x i .  PEOmsOB A M t n  AMTi-iBFLAfIOHARU PROGRAM
In June 1946 .Alvin Hansen, professor of Political Econ­
omy at Harvard University# stated s.
”to preserve the integrity of our money, seven 
policies are necessary:' • (I)'to continue price 
control# (2) to rapidly increase the production , 
of houses, consumers* durables, and clothing,
(3) to secure'a balanced adjustment of wages to 
man-hour productivity without pushing wage rates 
so high as to raise labor cost - and necessitate 
a general over-all increase in prices, (4) to 
continue high taxation, (5 ) -to'continue a program 
of saving by the entire population with special 
emphasis on the purchase of savings bonds* (6) to 
apply treasury funds derived from excess tax rev­
enues or sale" of bonds to the public in excess.or 
redemptions, to retire Government securities held 
by commercial banks, (7) to insure, that commerc­
ial banks would not'abuse their- access to Federal 
Reserve Bank credit and, thus build up excess re­
serves as a basis for unwarranted -monetary ex­
pans ion .**•
Professor Hansen * a proposals"to.combat inflation were 
similar to Professor SXichtsr-s. They both favored price con* 
trol,' a sensible wage policy ..to prevent a wage-price spiral,
•frif l jn irfĉ Ji «■,f in 'll (H,i >WIi,h
20Sllehtei># B i d ., p. 2390*
^ ■'■Alvin Hansen, "Inflation,” Yale Review. Vol. 35« 
Wo. 4, June 1946, p. 710.
continued high taxation, reducing commercial bank holdings of 
Government securities, permitting bank credit expansion to bo 
voluntarily limited by the bankers themselves, increasing the 
sale of savings bonds, and finally, stimulation of residential
;-S>V
building by assisting in allocating scarce materials*
The voluntary measures of Professors Hansen and 511chter 
for monetary inflation control are not applicable to the econ­
omy in a country like the United States were competition is 
keen. It has been necessary in the past for the Federal Gov­
ernment to use direct and selective controls to carry out 
policies for the social well-being of the economy. Therefore, 
the writer believes stronger measures than those suggested by 
Professors Hansen and Sllchter would have been-necessary to 
reduce monetary inflationary pressures during the postwar 
period,. 5uch measures are included in the program proposed 
in Chapter W.
CHAPTER V
A PROGRAM TO CONTROL POSTWAR INFLATION
The monetary anti-inflationary proposals considered 
to be the most effective, In addition to a number of.measures 
suggested by the writer, will be examined in the present 
chapter from the point of view of their probable effectiveness 
in halting or retarding inflation* if they had been adopted 
by the Federal Government at the beginning of 1946#
A program designed to combat monetary inflation would 
also assist in preventing commodity-price inflation. However, 
in addition to this fiscal anti-inflationary program, direct 
measures, such as price regulation, wage stabilization, and 
scarce material allocation would have been necessary to com­
pletely retard general inflation of the American economy. In 
order to confine the present study to reasonable limits, how­
ever, it is restricted largely to a plan to retard inflation 
from the monetary angle only.
The purposes of the monetary anti-inflationary plan 
proposed in this chapted are (1) to decrease the amount of bank- 
held Government securities or shift them to less inflationary 
holders, (2) to keep the cost of carrying the public debt as 
low as possible and at the same time retard debt monetization, 
and (3) to reduce or retard the Increase of purchasing power
of individuals and corporations*
The measures considered to be worthy of Inclusion In 
the proposed plan to combat postwar Inflation are the follow­
ing:
(1) A secondary reserve proposal*
(2) A primary reserve proposal.
(3) A compulsory savings plan for individuals.
(4) An Increase in corporate net income tax rates.
In order to assess the effectiveness of such measures, 
an attempt will be made to trace their probable effects In 
1946, if they had been adopted at the beginning of the year.
1. SECONDARY RESERVE PLAN
At the beginning of 1946 it did not appear feasible to 
permit the interest rates of Government securities to be set 
by the demand of the market, because refunding of the short­
term Government debt could not have been accomplished except 
at higher rates, and this would have Increased the cost of 
carrying the debt. Therefore, to prevent these occurrences 
and to help retard debt monetisation it Is assumed that an 
Act was passed by Congress at the end of 1945 to permit the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to Impose 
a maximum secondary reserve requirement of 50 per cent upon 
all commercial banks in the United States. This would also
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have accomplished the broad purpose of reducing the lending 
power of the banks.
It is assumed that the Board of Governors set the 
secondary reserve rate at 20 per cent effective January X* 
1946. This plan would have required all commercial banks in 
the United States to hold short-term Government securities, 
namely, treasury bills or treasury certificates in the amount 
of 20 per cent against their demand deposits.
Assumed Effects of the Secondary Reserve Plan in 1946. 
Actual net demand deposits of all banks w ere 105,923 million 
dollars as of December 31, 1945* With the assumed 20 per cent 
secondary reserve requirement in effect, a minimum of 21,185 
million dollars of short-term Government securities presumably 
would have been held by the commercial banks, the banks at 
the end of,1945 actually held 20,56? million dollars of treas­
ury bills and certificates. Therefore, only a small amount of
short-term securities would have had to be purchased to meet
;
the proposed secondary reserve requirements.
During 1946 demand deposits decreased approximately 
13,478 million dollars and on December 31, 1946 totaled ap­
proximately 92,445 million. Table 5 on the following page 
shows the total demand deposits for all commercial banks at 
the end of 1945 and 1946, and the amount of Treasury bills or 
certificates that they would have been required to hold under
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the suppositious secondary reserve plan.
TABLE V
DEMAND DEPOSITS OF ALL COMMERCIAL BANKS
AND
ASSUMED SECONDARY RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
December 31# 1945 and 1946
December 31 
____  1945
December 31 
.-.. 1946 ..
Total Demand Deposits $105,923,000 $92,445,000
Assumed Secondary Reserve 
Requirements 20$ 20$
Total Assumed Secondary 
Reserve
(Treasury bills or certificates)$21,185,000 $18,489,000
ii- -.. :..- ---  ....--......- ■ . ... ■ '...-.-. ‘.-
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins, 1946, p. 892, 1947# p* 870.
The proposed 20 per cent secondary reserve requirement 
would have required approximately 18,489 million dollars of 
shortrterm Government securities to have been held by commerc­
ial banks at the end of 1946. However, the banks had reduced 
their actual holdings of Treasury bills and certificates from 
20,567 million dollars at the end of 1945# to 12,408 million 
at’ the end of 1946, thereby creating a theoretical short-term 
Government security deficit of 6,081 million dollars. ($18,489 
million - $12,408 million) The accompanying table on the 
following page shows the actual change in all classes of mark­
etable Government securities held by commercial banks during 
1946.
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TABLE VI
MARKETABLE PUBLIC DEBT HELD BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 
December 31* 1945 and 1946 
(millions of dollars)
Holdings Change in Holdings
Dec. 31 .Holdings Dec. 31Type of Issue ...... - 1.955,,.... 1946 1946 .
Treasury Bills 2,476 - 1,289 1,187Treasury Certificates 18,091 - 6,870 11,221Treasury Not©8 15,701 - 9,581 6,120Treasury Bonds 46,535 + 1,873 48,408Other* -+ 26 26
TOTALS 82.803 -15.841 66.962
* Postal Savings, prewar bonds, and a small amount of Guaran 
teed securities.
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947# P» 890.
Column (2), Table 7 on the following page shows the 
shift of 6,081 million dollars of commercial bank securities 
that presumably would have occurred under the proposed 
secondary reserve plan. It'is assumed that the banks would 
have reduced their holdings of long-term Government securities 
rather than decrease their high-yielding loan portfolios, and 
the securities would have been supplied by the Federal Reserve 
Banks from their short-term security holdings, or from a 
special short-term Treasury security issued exclusively for 
bank holding, to meet the short-term security deficit.
TA3L8 V II
MARKETABLE PU3LIC DEB? HELD 31 C0CK1RCUL 3A?!K5-19li6
AND
ASSDMSD CHANGES RESULTING FROM T?U6 PROPOSED ANTI-ISFUTICmARX PUN
(million# of dollar#)
Assumed Shift in Holdings Resulting from . iasmed
Type of Issue
Actual
Total
Holdings
T)ec.31,19L6
(1)
Secondary
Reserve
Require­
ment
(2)
Increased
Primary
Reserve-ir
Compulsory
Savings
Plan
(M
Increased Change* In 
Corporate Holding* 
Incase in 191*6 
Tax (Total)
(5) (6)
learned 
Holding* 
Dec. 31, 191*6 
(1) - (6)
(7)
Treasury Bills 
Treasury Certificates 
Treasury Note# 
Treasury Bonds 
Others*
1,16711,221
6,120
1*8,1*08
26
t 669 
/5.U12 
- 51*7 
-5,531*
- 230 
-1,858
- 31*1* 
-2,786
-101*
-850
/ 669 
i 5,1*12 
- 1,225 -11,028
1,856
16,633
1*,89537,380
26
TOTALS 66,962 -2,088 -3J130 -951* - 6,172 60,790
* Postal Savings* Prewar Bonds* and a small amount of Guaranteed securities.
Source* (1) federal Reserve Bulletin, 191*7, V* 390.
(2) Assumed shift in holdings described on pa^es 7h and ?£•
(3) Table 10, Column (6), Page 82. The increase in primary reserve requirement applies only
to member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
(!*} Table U ,  Column (3), Page 85*
(5) Table 11, Column (*), Page 85.
(6) Totals of Colisans (2), (3), (!*), and (5)*
(f) Colxnn (6) subtracted fro® Column (l).
To meet the secondary reserve deficiency of 6,081 
million, dollars, It Is assumed that the commercial hanks would 
• have purchased m  addition al 669 million dollars in Treasury 
hills and '§*412 million in freasury certificates* To obtain 
funds.lor these, purchases, it is assumed that they';would have 
sold mx- additional’ §4? million dollars in Treasury notes and 
5,554 million in'Treasury bonded ■ The composition of the com­
mercial hanks'1' marketable Government security holdings, as a 
result of the assumed shift from long- to short-term securities 
is shown in Table $ on the following' page. {$1*856 million in 
Treasury'Mil# t $16*635 million In' Treasury: certificates ■*• 
required, secondary reserves' of -$18 *489-*)
%he • theoretical shift from long* to 'short-term, Govern* 
ment securities by the commercial hanks was.assumed to have 
been divided as follows s’ "
(1) ‘The decrease In Treasury notes and bonds was divided 
according' to the approximate actual' ratios of' notes to bonds 
held.by'the :commercial ,Mnks. at the .-end of 1946.* Thus* II per 
cent of the ■ total'decrease of 6 ,081 million dollars of long- 
%$m securities■ were notes and 89 per cent:were bonds*
(2) The increase.'in Treasury bills and'certificates was 
divided .according to the- approximate actual ratios of bills
to certificates; held by commercial banks, at the end.of ,1946* 
Thus, 9 per cent of. the total increase of 6,081 million dollars 
of • short-term securities were Mils and, 91 per cent were eer-> 
tifi cates •
It is believed by the writer that this is a |ustiflable 
method of assuming the increase- e-r- decrease in Government 
securities*, and would, therefore, - maintain the ratio between 
Treasury notes and bonds, and Treasury Mils and certificates* 
which existed at the end of 1946*
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TABLE VIII
ASSUMED MARKETABLE DEBT HELD BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 1946
(millions of dollars)
Treasury Bills 1,856
Treasury Certificates 16,633Treasury Notes 5,573Treasury Bonds 42*874
Other* .26
TOTALS 66.962
* Postal Savings, prewar bonds, and a small amount of . 
Guaranteed securities.
Presumably there would have been no change In the total 
amount of Government securities held by commercial banks, but 
only a shift from long- to short-term securities to meet the 
requirements of the proposed secondary.reserve plan. An im­
portant effect of the plan would have been the retarding of - 
debt monetization, because the commercial banks would have 
had to hold 6,081 million dollars more short-term Government 
securities at the end of 1946* Presumably they would have 
reduced correspondingly their long-term Government security 
holdings.
II. INCREASED PRIMARY RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
The second anti-inflationary proposal involves the 
amendment of the Federal Reserve Act at the end of 1945 to 
permit the Board of Governors to raise reserve requirements
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to double the maximum ratios permitted by the Banking Act of 
1935* The purpose would be twofold: (1) to act as a psycho­
logical threat against the member banks. In other words, the 
* Board would be able to use its increased power over bank re­
serves as a "big stick” against member banks — * threatening 
the banks with a raise in requirements if excessive credit 
expansion occurred; and (2) to empower the Board to actually 
raise reserve requirements, thereby causing member banks to 
restrict lending.
To raise reserve requirements of member banks would 
affect the lending power of the banking system, because during 
1946 member banks of the Reserve System controlled over 83 
per cent of the total demand deposits of the commercial bank­
ing system, and over 55 per cent of the total time deposits 
of the entire banking system. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 
on the following.page show that the average amount of demand 
deposits was 77,333 million dollars and time deposits 27,059 
million in member banks of the* Federal Reserve System during 
the second half of December 1946.
At the beginning of 1946 the actual reserve percentages 
in effect were 20, 20, and 14 per cent on demand deposits for 
central reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respect­
ively, and 6 per oent on time deposits for all member banks. 
The percentages of demand deposits were at their maximums in
8°
TABLE IX
TOTAL DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE*
AND
ASSUMED PRIMARY REQUIRED RESERVES 
(millions of dollars)
Class of Banks and 
Federal Reserve Dlst.
Actual
Demand
Deposits
1946
Assumed
Reserves
Required
1946
_ _ L 2 L  ..
Actual 
Time 
Deposits 
1946 
. ..... ( 3 ± _
Assumed
Reserves
Required
1946
.. „ ( 4 L
Central Reserve Cities 25,346 
Reserve Cities 28,256 
Country 23,731
5,576
6,216
3,797
2,276
10,805
13,978
182
865
1,118
TOTALS J L B 2 15a5.82... 27.059 2.165
* Averages of Daily Figures for Second Half of December 
Source: Columns (1) and (3) Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947,
p • 168•
Columns (2) and (4), computed by using the reserve percentages 
which appear on Page 81, and the actual deposits in Columns 
(1) and (3).
reserve city and country banks, and over 66 per cent of the 
demand deposits were held in these banks. The percentages 
on time deposits were at their maximums for all banks, and 
over 8? per cent of the total time deposits were also held 
in reserve city and country banks. Therefore, if the reserve 
requirements of country and reserve city banks could have been 
raised, it would have decreased their excess reserves sub­
stantially and possibly forced some contraction of bank credit.
Assumed Effects of the Primary Reserve Plan. It is 
assumed that the Federal Reserve Act was amended at the end of
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1945 to permit the Board of Governors to raise primary re­
serve requirements to double the maximum ratios permitted 
by the Banking Act of 1935* It is also assumed that the 
Board at the beginning of 1946 raised reserve requirements 
to the following theoretical percentages:
22 per cent for central reserve city banks on demand 
deposits and 8 per cent on ti o deposits.
22 per cent for reserve city banks on demand deposits
and 3 per cent on time deposits.
16 per cent for country banks on demand deposits and
8 per cent on time deposits.
Table 10 on the following page shows the assumed 
changes resulting from the increased reserve requirements. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show total, required, and excess 
reserves of member banks during the second half of December, 
1946, amounting to 16,567, 15*666, and 901 million dollars 
respectively. Column (4) shows that the assumed required 
reserves would have been approximately 17*734 million dollars, 
if the primary reserve requirements had boon increased as 
proposed above during 1946. The required reserves presumably 
would have increased from 15*666 to 17,754 million dollars, or 
2,038 million as a result of the proposed increased require­
ments. It is assumed that the member banks would have carried
TABES X
RESERVES OF MEMBER BANKS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE STSTEM*
AND THE
ASSUMED CHANGES RESULTING FROM PROPOSED INCREASED RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
(millions of dollars)
Actual Reserves * Second . Assumed Reserves Resulting from Increased
Half of December 192*6 . Requirements December 192*6
Class of Banks 
and Federal 
Reserve Districts
Total
(i)
Required
(2)
Excess
(3)
Required
<U)
Deficit
(W - (1) (5)
Additional
Required
(6)
Total Excess 
(1) / (6) (7) - (!*: 
(7) (8)
Central Reserve City 5»2!j2 5,206 36 5,758 - 516 / 552 .5,79b 36Reserve City 6,528 6,299 229 7,081 - 553 / 782 . .7,310 229Country h,797 !»,161 636 li,9l5 - 118 / 75U 5,551 636
TOTALS 16,567 15,666 901 17,75b -1,187 /2,088 18,655 901
* Averages of Daily Figures,
Sources* (1), (2), and (3) Federal. Re serve Bulletin, 19&7* p♦ 168.
(k) Table 9, Columns (2) / (W, Page 80.
(5>) Computed by subtracting Column (1) from Column (I*).
(6) Approximated figures to conform to the actual excess reserves figures in Column (3).
(7) Computed by adding Columns (1) and (6).
(8) Computed by subtracting Column (2*) from Column (7)*
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approximately the same excess reserves as they had before 
the proposed increased reserve requirements were put in 
effect, or approximately 901 million dollars* The assumed 
reserve deficit of member banks at the Reserve Banks would 
have been approximately 1,187 million dollars and is shown In 
Column (5)• It is assumed that member banks would have sold 
approximately 2,088 million dollars in Government securities 
to eliminate the assumed deficit and maintain approximately 
the same level of excess reserves as at the end of 1946*
It seems reasonable that the banks would have sold 
assets that yielded the least returns* Under the operations 
of the assumed secondary reserve plan, they would have h*& no 
excess short-term Government Securities to sell* Therefore, 
they would have sold their long-term Government 
The Federal Reserve Banks were required to buy any securities 
that the banks would have had to sell* Therefore, a shift 
of 2,088 million dollars of Government securities supposedly 
would have occurred between the Reserve Banks and their member 
banks* Column (7) shows the assumed total reserves to be 
18,655 million dollars. This figure was computed by adding 
the actual total reserves for the end of 1946 of 16,567 
million and the assumed additional reserves of 2,088 million* 
Column (8) shows the theoretical excess reserves of 901 million 
dollars at the end of 1946*
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The theoretical shift of securities from member banks 
to Reserve Banks would have affected the distribution of the 
marketable public debt during 1946. This change in distri­
bution of the marketable debt is shown in the accompanying 
table on the following page. Column (1) shows the distribution 
of the total marketable debt of 176,658 million dollars at 
the end of 1946. Column (2) shows the assumed shift of the 
distribution of 2,088 million dollars of securities from the 
commercial banks to the Reserve Banks as a result of the in-
pcreased reserve requirements. •
The effect of this plan on the.Government security hold­
ings of commercial banks of the Reserve System is shown in 
Column (3)> Table 7» Page 76. Only long-term Government 
security holdings of the commercial banks wdrse decreased in 
Table 7* because the banks were required to hold,a certain 
amount of short-term Government securities under the theoret-, 
ical secondary reserve plan. To meet the assumed increase in 
reserve requirements presumably they would have sold their 
long-term, low-yielding Treasury notes and bonds. The decrease
2This includes 6,897 commercial banks of the Reserve 
System of the total 6,900 member banks. The difference of 
three banks were listed as savings banks with less than 15 
million dollars in deposits. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the increased reserve requirements would affect the reserves 
of only the commercial banks of the Reserve System.
t&nm m
distribuiigm* of marketabie fmuc DEBT
km
THE ASSUMED CHAWGES RESULHiG FROM THE PROPOSED AHT1-INFIAT10BARI PIAH
(millions of dollars)
Assumed Shift in Distribution 
in 191*6 Resulting fro®
Type of Holders 
of Securities
Actuals Increased 
foialiWot Reserve 
Bee.31, 191*6 Requirements 
(X) (2)
Compulsory
Savings
Plan
(3)
Increased 
Corporate 
Income faxm
Assumed 
Total 
Changes in 
Distributioj! 
in 191*6
(5)
Assumed 
Final 
i Total 
Dec# 31,191*6 
(6)
U# S. Gov’t Agencies 
Federal Reserve Banks 
Conmiercial Banks t 
Mutual Savings Banks 
Insurance Companies 
Others
Treasury Credit
6,302
23,3*0 /2,088 
66,962 -2,088 
11,*21 
2U, 3U6 
hit, 177
285
-3,130
-1,328
A,7lt3
-  87 '
-  95lt
~ bOl*
/ I , 716 
-6,172
-1,732
A,7U3
6,302
25,066
60,790
11,521
2!t,3it6
i*2,Wi5
U,7U3
TOTAiS
Sources: (X) Federal Reserve Bulletin, 191*7> p. 306,
(2) Table 10, Column (6), Page 82#
(3) Table 12, Column (I*), Page 90.
(It) Computed by assuming a 35 per cent effective yield on total corporate profits# The 
description for this column appears on Pages 95 and 96#
(5) Totals of Columns (2), (3), and (U)#
(6) Computed by adding or subtracting the figures of Columns (1) and (5).
a>
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amounted to 23Q million dollars in Treasury notes and 1,858 
million in Treasury bonds.3
The principal effects of this measure would have been 
(1) to shift 2,088 million dollars of short-term Government 
securities from commercial banks to Reserve Banks, and (2) to 
reduce the degree of multiple credit expansion that would have 
been possible on the basis of any reserves created by the sale 
of the assumed 2,088 million dollars of securities to the 
Reserve Banks.
III. COMPULSORY SAVINGS PLAN
The concept for the proposed compulsory savings plan 
was borrowed from John Maynard Keynes* suggested compulsory 
loan plan which appeared In his book. How To Pay For The War, 
published in 1940. The compulsory savings plan as proposed 
would have been superimposed upon the tax structure of the 
United States at the beginning of 1946.
It is realized that such a measure to be effective 
would bear most heavily upon expenditures of the low- and 
medium-income groups which account for the most consumption 
of goods and services. Thus it would not conform to the 
ability-to-pay tax principle. With the threat of serious 
inflation, however, it would have been generally beneficial 
to cut substantially the purchasing power of those income
^The explanation of the distribution of the decrease 
in long-term securities appears on page 77.
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classes In the “highest propensity to consume." Such a 
reduction of purchasing power during 1946 would have relieved 
commo&lty-prlce Inflationary pressures substantially by re­
ducing the inequality of demand over supply# Therefore, the 
compulsory savings plan is considered Justifiable from the 
socl&l-expedlency standpoint of benefiting society as a whole#
John Maynard Keynes when writing about the compulsory 
loan plan in 1940 stated thatt "A general plan like this one 
to which all are required to conform is like the rule of the 
road, --everyone gains and no one can lose* . . . For the 
plan is Intended to prevent people from getting In one another’s 
way in spending their money."^
It is not that this plan alone would have controlled 
the inflation of the American economy at the beginning of 
1946. However, if it had been used in conjunction with the 
other measures suggested in this study, it would have assisted 
tremendously in retarding inflation# In addition to reducing 
purchasing power, the government could have used the revenue 
secured from the proposed compulsory savings plan to retire 
Government securities, and this shift of Government debt 
would have acted as a deflationary force* The total public 
debt would not have been reduced because a credit for the
^John Maynard Keynes, How to Fay for the War, (New 
Yorkt Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1940)7 PP* 10-12.#
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amount each Individual loaned to the government would have 
been carried in the treasury Department’s accounts* There­
fore, only a shift in the debt would have occurred. This 
part of the debt would have been nonmarketable and nonre- 
deemable hence, It would have been non-inflationary*
The compulsory savings measure has a three-fold pur­
pose: (1) to withdraw purchasing power from individuals
during a time of■large demand and small supplies of goods and 
services; (2) to defer the spending of individual earnings; 
and (3) to return the savings, thus restoring purchasing power 
to Individuals during a recession period when more purchasing 
power is needed to forestall cumulative deflation.5
Assumed Effects of the Compulsory Savings Plan in 1946. 
It is not the intention of the writer to make a detailed study 
and analysis of the rates to be Imposed under a compulsory 
savings plan, since that would be beyond the scope of this 
study. However, rates are assumed which appear to furnish 
a logical way of apportioning the savings to the various in­
come groups.
The latest percentages of income received by each 
Income class appeared, in the Statistics of Income for 1945 
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It Is conjectured that
^Keynes, Ibid... pp. 10-11.
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there was little or no change In the percentages of income 
received by each group during 1946. Therefore, to compute 
the probable Income received in 1946 by each specific income 
group, the estimated total personal income for 1946 of 177*
217 million dollars was divided by the 1945 percentages of 
income for the different income classes* The statistics 
as shown in Column (1), Table 12 on the following page indi­
cate that the groups with income from §1,500 to §10,000 re­
ceived 73*25 per cent of the estimated total personal income 
in the United States during 1945* Therefore, these groups 
would be required to supp iy the bulk of the compulsory sav­
ings funds during 1946. The writer believes that the income 
groups from §2,000 to §4,000 which recelved43*04 per cent 
of the total personal income during 1945, had the largest 
"propensity to consume,1 and, therefore, should have been 
forced to loan the largest percentage of proposed compulsory 
savingB to the government during 1946.
Column (3) of the accompanying table shows the percent­
ages of compulsory savings that presumably would have been 
derived from each specific income group. These percentages 
are not rates that would have been imposed on each income 
class, but are percentages of total personal income that 
supposedly would have been loaned by each income group. For 
instance, family exemptions would have been granted under the
TABLE X II
COMPULSORY SAVINGS PLAN
Income Classes
Percentage 
Personal 
Income 
for 19U5 
<*>
Assumed 
Distribution 
of Personal 
Income 
for 191*6 
(2)
Assumed 
• Percentage 
Heturn from 
Compulsory 
Savings 
for 191*6
(3) .
Assumed 
Total Revenue 
Resulting from 
Compulsory 
Savings Plan 
for 192*6 
(2) x (3) - 
(1*)
Under $ $00 • . 1.25 2i215,213 - -0 500 - 1, 500 11*53 20,!»33il20 1 20l»,30C-1,500 - 2,000 10.2*2 18,166,011 2 369,3002,000 - 3,000 23.80 U2,177;6U6 li 1,687,0003,000 - i»,000 19*21; 3li,096,55l 1* 1,363,600U,ooo - 5»ooo 9.59 16,995,110 3 509,800
5,000 - 10,000 10.20 18,076,131* 2 , 361,500
10,000 and over 13*97 21i,757,215 1 21*7,500.
TOTALS 100.00 177,217,000 i*,?l*3,000
' Sources? (1) Statistics of Income for 19U5> Bureau of Internal Revenue, pp. lU-15.
(2) Computed by using percentages of Column (l) and estimated total personal income for 191*6.
(3) Hypothecated by the writer.
(h) Computed by multiplying Column (2) and the percentages of Column (3).
to©
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proposed compulsory savings plan. Therefore, a rate of 6 
or T per dent on the $2,000 to $4,000 Income class probably 
would have been required to return approximately 4 per cent 
of the total personal income received by that income group.
The net result of this proposal would have been (1) 
to permit the income classes below #500 to maintain their 
income intact, (2) to leave the aggregate income of the group 
below $2,000 nearly as high as before, (3) to reduce the 
aggregate income of the $2,000 to $4,000 income groups most 
severely, and (4) to reduce, the aggregate income of the 
groups above $4,000, but restrict their aggregate,amount of 
Treasury credits to a smaller amount than the lower income 
groups.
The total personal income for 1946 was approximately 
177*217 million dollars, and using the 1945 percentages of 
income distribution for each specific group, the assumed 
1946 personal income group distribution was computed and is, 
shown in Column (2) of Table 12. Column (3) shows the per- . 
centage returns supposedly secured from each income group 
under the proposed compulsory savings plan, and Column {4} f. 
shows the assumed total revenue of 4,743 million dollars 
secured and its distribution, among the specific income 
classes.
It is assumed that the Treasury would have used the
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4*743 million dollars of additional revenue to retire 
Government securities# This would have resulted in a shift 
of the Government debt# The shift of 4*743 million dollars 
from marketable Government securities to the Treasury credit 
as a result of the proposed compulsory savings plan* is shown 
in Column (3), Table 11* Page 85* It is assumed that the 
reduction of the marketable debt would have been divided as 
follows
(1) 6 per cent from the Reserve Bank holdings#
(2) 28 per cent from the holdings of corporations, 
and businesses. (Others)
(3) 66 per cent from commercial bank holdings.
Column (3) Table 11* Page 85, shows that 285 million
dollars of Government securities supposedly would have been
6These percentages were hypothecated by the writer to 
conform as closely as possible to the actual changes in the 
distribution and reduction of the marketable Government se­
curity holdings during 1946. The securities held by U. B* 
Government Agencies* mutual savings* banks, and insurance 
companies were not assumed to have been reduced by the funds 
secured from the theoretical savings plan* because they are 
usually long-term permanent security’holders* and to reduce 
the holdings of commercial banks* Reserve Banks,, and others 
is considered more deflationary. During 1946 the mutual 
savings banks and insurance companies actually Increased their 
holdings of Government securities by approximately 2,193 mil­
lion dollars. An arbitrary plan of reduction had to be 
selected by the writer to Indicate the decrease in Government 
securities as a result of the proposed compulsory savings 
plan* and this method is believed to be reasonable.
retired fro® Reserve Rank lri.pidi.iigs> 3* 130 fro® commercial 
battksy'lan^vi^28; million .fro® others. Presumably there' 
would .have■ heeu reduction* in the total marketable debt*
however, a shift of 4*743 million dollars of Government 
debt̂ frp®'.'. commercial hanks , Reserve Banks*- and other hold­
ings-to a-nonredeemahle‘and nonmarketable Treasury credit 
would have bean accomplished by the proposed compulsory
The assumed; reduction of 3*130 million dollars of 
long-term commercial hank-held Government securities is 
shown In Oolumn (4)* Table (7, Page ?$* The decrease of 
hank-held debt which reduces hank deposits is generally
considered as deflationary* and for this reason one of the
1
aims of the anti-inflationary.plan-was-to force contraction 
of hank-held Government debt.-To dothis some of the meas­
ures proposed in this study were designed to create a Treas­
ury surplus* or treasury balances to retire Government debt * 
The compulsory savings plan would not have created addition­
al Treasury surplus# However* it would have increased 
Treasury balances at the He serve Banka so that Government 
securities could have been retired from the inflationary 
holders, such as commercial banks. Furthermore* the theor­
etical secondary reserve plan would have restricted^*10
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sale of Government securities by the commercial banks to 
long-term Treasury notes or bonds.
The cost of administration of the compulsory savings 
plan would have been defrayed by the savings in interest 
rates on the assumed amount of public debt retired. The 
average interest rate cost of carrying the debt was approx­
imately 2 per cent* which would indicate an assumed savings 
during 1946 of approximately 94.8 million dollars in inter­
est rates on the 4,743 million dollar shift of Government 
debt as a result of the savings plan. However* to make the 
proposed plan more attractive to those persons who would 
have had to supply the Government with loan funds, it is 
suggested that interest at the rate of 1^ per cent would 
have been paid on the Treasury credit. This would have left 
the saving of ̂  per cent in interest rates to be used to 
defray the cost of administration of the proposed savings 
plan, or approximately 2.4 million dollars.
IV. INCREASED CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Business during the transition period made unusually 
high capital outlays, and this stimulated inflation. These 
capital expenditures competed with individual and government 
expenditures for scarce materials, and the incomes generated 
in the process of this capital formation exerted pressure on
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scarce supplies o f consumer goods*
Professor Louis Shore in  December 1948 wrote th a t:
"Increases in  corporate p r o f its  hare helped  
to push the in f la t io n  along# Corporate p ro f its  
a f te r  taxes hare grown from $5*0 b i l l io n  in  1939 
to  $8*7 b i l l io n  in  1945 and have more than doubled 
again amounting to  $18*1 b i l l io n  in  1947* These 
la rg e  p ro f its  a f t e r  taxes hare perm itted  payment 
o f record amounts o f diTldends and hare a lso  l e f t  
la rg e  sums a T s ila b le  to  be plowed back in to  cap­
i t a l  expansion*
"The fa c t th a t business p r o f its  hare been high  
during the past severa l years has le d  some to  the  
conclusion, re tro s p e c tiv e ly , th a t i t  would be 
e a s ie r now to  contain  in f la t io n  i f  th e  taxes on 
business had been h igher throughout the war and 
t ra n s it io n  period* They appear to  s tr ik e  w ith  
t e l l in g  fo rce a t the wisdom o f the 1945 repeal 
o f the e x c e s s -p ro flts  tax* The course o f  ac tion  
seemed less  c le a r ,  however, in  1946 when emp­
hasis everywhere was on the need to  strengthen  
the f in a n c ia l reserves o f business to  accomplish 
a speedy reconversion o f the economy from war to  
peace production*"7
Assumed E ffe c ts  o f the Increased Corporate Income Tax 
in  1946• In  1946 corporate taxes to ta le d  approxim ately 8,601  
m illio n  d o lla rs , o f which 4 ,400 m ill io n  was back excess 
p r o f its  taxes , and the remaining 4,801 m ill io n  was corporate  
Income taxes.®  T o ta l corporate p r o f its  and Inventory  v a lu a ­
t io n  adjustment fo r  1946 was approxim ately 16,155 m illio n  
d o lla rs , and the estim ated y ie ld  o f  corporate income taxes
7shere, op* elt*, pp. 848-860*
6"national Income," Supplement of the Survey o f Current 
Business, July 1947, (Washington, 15. C.: tFETtel States Govern- 
raent Printing Office, 19 47 ), pp. 19 -81 .
96
was 26 per cent. However, If corporate tax rates had been 
raised to yield 35 per cent, approximately 5*647 million 
dolla?>s would have been secured from corporate income taxes 
dux'ing 1946. Tho total corporate taxes would have been 
approximately 10,046 million dollars, under the proposed 
increased rates. Of this, approximately 4,400 million dollars 
would have been back excess profits taxes and the remaining 
5,647 million would have been secured from the proposed in­
creased corporate income taxes. This is an assumed increase 
of 1,445 million dollars*
This proposed increase in corporate income tax rates 
would be included in the suggested anti-inflationary plan 
described in this chapter and therefore, it is assumed that 
Congress at the beginning of 1946 passed an Act authorizing 
increases in corporate Income tax rates, so that they would 
yield an estimated 35 per cent. This would have required 
increases in the 1945 graduated corporate income tax rates, 
by either lowering the corporate profits exemptions or in­
creasing the prevailing graduated rates of 21 to 38 per cents.
Presumably the Treasury would have had an additional 
1,445 million dollars available in 1946 to retire Government 
securities. Column (4), Table 11, Page 85 shows that the 
distribution of the 1,445 million dollar reduction of market­
able Government securities would have been 87 million from
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Reserve Bank holdings, 954 million from oommeroial honk-0*
holdings* and 404 million from others.
This proposed anti-inflationary moasur© Is tho only 
proposal suggested In thiq study that would have docreased 
the total amount of the public debt* The other suggested 
measures moroly shifted the debt* Howovor* the proposed in- 
creased corporate income tax rates would havo increased Gov­
ernment rovenuo during 194d and permitted additional retire­
ment of the public debt*
The effect of the proposed plan upon commercial bank- 
held marketable Government securities is shown In Column (5)$ 
Table 7„ Page 76* Approximately 954 million dollars of long­
term bank-held marketable Covommont securities presumably
1
would have boon sold by commercial banks to the Treasury*
Tho theoretical secondary reserve plan would have restricted 
the sal© of Government securities by tho coraoorcial banks to 
long-term Treasury notes or bonds#
V* ADDXTXOHAL ANTI- XITFLATIO: 1ARY PROPOSALS
It is believed that the measures proposed in this 
chapter would, have, retarded substantially postwar monetary 
inflation and assisted in tampering conuaodity-prio© infla-
fi .The same porcontagos of dobt reduction were usod as 
nere describod on page 92.
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tionary pressures. It is recognized that additional 
measures would have been necessary to fully control infla­
tion. therefore, the following measures are suggested to 
supplement the fiscal anti-inflationary program?
(1) Regulation of consumer credit*
(2) Regulation of stock-market credit.
(3) Improved price regulation*
(4) A wage stabilization plan.
(5) Allocation of scarce materials*
to attempt a thorough discussion of these additional 
measures is beyond the scope of this study. Only brief ref­
erence can be made to these supplemental controls?
. \(1) Consumer credit control wqs continued during most 
of 1946, but after December 1 Regulation W was revised and 
restricted to the regulation of Installment financing of a 
relatively few items of sizable unit-cost. Finally, on 
November 1, 1947 the control of consumer credit was dis­
continued. It was reimposed In August 1948 on a limited 
scale, fhe regulation of consumer credit during the entire 
postwar period, to restrict consumer purchasing power, would 
have been necessary to relieve commodity-price Inflationary 
pressures *
(2) Margin requirements were raised to 100 per cent 
at the beginning of 1946 by the Board of Governors to force
contraction of stock-market credit * At the beginning of 1947 
they were lowered to 75 per cent in recognition of the abate* 
ment of stock-market credit expansion during 1946* The
N
regulation of credit proposed m  this study would have included 
the same or a similar program* Such control was essential In 
the postwar period to restrict the expansion of stock-market 
credit *
(3) Price regulation was continued through October 
1946. After November 1, 1946 only sugar* rice and rents 
were subjected to control by OPA. Finally* on lay 31* 1947 
OPA expired and sugar control and rationing were transferred 
to the Department of Agriculture, and rent control was placed 
under the control of the Housing Expediter*^0 At the end of 
194Br only rent control was under Government supervision*
The termination of OPA allowed a rapid rise in prices in 
United States during the latter part of 1946 and 1947. To 
help retard commod ity-pr iee inflation, price control should 
have been maintained and improved during the postwar period, 
to allow a gradual and orderly rise in prices until OPA .could 
be terminated without causing sudden and sharp price Increases. 
The aim of the proposed price regulation program would have 
been a better epst-prioe relationship of all goods under OPA 
control•
(4) A postwar wage stabilization plan should have been
■ ̂ Twenty-second Quarterly Report of OPA* May 31# 1947* 
Washington# p. C.; United States Government Printing Office, 
1947), p* i»
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Introduced to retard a wage-prlce spiral, by eliminating
*
wage increases that were not the result of increased pro­
ductivity of labor. Wage Increases without corresponding 
increases in productivity merely increase production costs 
which* in turn, lead to further price increases. The wage- 
prlce .spiral which occurred during the postwar transition 
period could have been at least greatly tempered by a wage 
stabilization program.
(5) During the postwar period there was an unequal 
distribution of scarce materials and a number of essential 
industries, such as housing, were hampered by the lack of 
material available. Therefore, to eliminate this bottleneck 
in the reconversion of the American economy to peacetime pur 
suits, the allocation of scarce materials by a Government 
Blanning Board would have been included In the postwar anti- 
inflationary program.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY W  CONCLUSIONS
When the Federal Reserve System was created In 1915 
It was established "in an era when the monetary problem was 
one of soarcity and rigid limitation on expansion; it has
come to operate in an era when the problem is instead one
*
of superabundance and of rigidities in the way of contrac­
tion."'1
The original principles drafted by the authors of the 
Federal Reserve Act expanded into a control of the cost, 
supply, and availability of money* Only through trial and 
error were its most important credit control devices estab­
lished. The principal general instruments through which 
Federal Reserve authorities could exercise their powers over 
bank credit are discount rate control, open market operations 
and changes in reserve requirements. The Federal Reserve 
officials at first considered that their power to raise or 
lower discount rates was their moot potent weapon to control 
bank credit. After 1920 discount rat© control was used very 
little and open market operations became the dominant power.
As a means of credit expansion, open market operations 
and discount rate control are limited by the reserve position
The Federal Reserve System its Purposes and Functions 
op. clt.. p. 115*
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of the Federal Reserve Banks, and at the commercial bank level
by the demand for bank credit#
The last instrument of general credit control, raising 
or lowering reserve requirements, has not been used a great
deal during the Federal Reserve*s existence*
The first selective instrument of direct control came 
into being under the Security Exchange Act in 1934 which 
permitted the Federal Reserve authorities to set margin re­
quirements for stock-market credit. The second selective 
instrument, consumer credit regulation, was granted to the 
Board of Governora in 1942, and authorized direct control over 
the expansion of consumer credit during the war.
The Federal Reserve System’s general instruments of 
credit control were used sparingly during the defense and 
war period because it was necessary to provide banks with easy 
access to a volume of reserves sufficient to enable them to 
absorb all newly-issued Government securities not taken by 
other investors. In addition a stable market had to be main­
tained where the credit needs of the Government and industry 
could be satisfied promptly and at low cost. This method of 
financing was inflationary, but it had to be permitted be­
cause of the Government*s fiscal requirements. This situation 
existed in the United States at the end of the war: first,
a volatile situation of an expanding purchasing power and a
shortage of civilian goods which produced heavy inflationary 
pressures on the price structuref and second, the huge Gov­
ernment debt which had enlarged the deposit currency and 
money in circulation to three times the 1940 volume, plus the 
fact that commercial banks held over one-quarter of the 
Government securities issued *
these monetary and coramodi ty-price inflationary 
pressures were counteracted during the war by direct controls 
over demand, supplies and prices of goods, and direct controls 
over wages* Serious inflation was avoided by maintenance of 
controls, as well as through the public's exercise of volun­
tary restraint and investment of savings in Government secur­
ities - After the war was over, however, the public clamored 
for an early lifting of these restraints and a restoration 
of the prewar economy.
The program followed by the government to combat 
inflation during the transition period consisted of a number 
of direct control measures, namely:, (1) full price regula­
tion until November 1946, then decontrol of all items until 
only rent ceilings remained at the end of 1948; (2) regula­
tion of consumer credit until Hovember 1946, then only 
regulation of installment credit under Regulation f, and 
finally, complete abandonment of all credit controls in 
November 1947I (3) the resumption of the regulation of
Installment credit on a few durable items in August 1948}
(4) continued regulation of stock-market credit with 100 
per cent margin requirements in effect from Januafy 1946 to 
January 1947, and finally, resumption of 75 per cent require­
ments, which was in effect at the end of 1948; and (5) the 
ratios of reserve requirements were not changed except for 
increases in requirements on demand deposits in central re­
serve city banks until the anti-inflationary bill passed 
by Congress in August 1948 permitted the ratios to be raised 
to 30, 24, and 18 per cent on demand deposits for central 
reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respectively, 
and to 7^ per cent on time deposits for all member banks*
Oh September 16, 1948 the Board raised reserve requirements 
on demand deposits to 26, 22 and 16 per cent for central 
reserve city, reserve city, and country banks respectively, 
and to 7§ per cent on time deposits for all member banks*
An Indirect measure, which maintained a mild squeeze 
on bank credit during the postwar period, was the Treasury 
debt-retirement program accomplished by the use of excess 
Federal revenue over expenditure to retire Government 
securities *
The anti-inflationary proposals of the Board of Gov­
ernors of the Federal ̂ serve System in its 1945 Annual 
Report, were designed to help restore the System’s capacity
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to exert an over-all restraint on undue expansion of bank 
credit* The primary reserve plan would have effected a 
shift of a certain amount of short-term Government securities 
from commercial Banks to Federal Reserve Banks and reduced 
the ratio of multiple credit expansion on the basis of a 
given amount of reserves* The plan would have discouraged 
further purchases of long-term issues or increased lending 
by banks, while the Federal Reserve prevented short-term 
interest rates on Government securities from rising above a 
level determined by the Treasury Department.
The secondary reserve plan would have forced commercial 
banks to retain substantial holdings of short-term Government 
securities, while limiting their ability to sell these secur­
ities to the Reserve Banks to increase their reserves and 
expand their lending power.
The bond limitation plan would have limited the amount 
of long-term marketable securities, both public and private, 
that any commercial bank could hold against its demand depos­
its. Therefore, the banks would have had to shift their 
portfolios, but there was no guarantee that they would have 
bought short-term Government securities to conform to this 
plan.
The primary reserve and secondary reserve plans were 
considered effective measures for combating inflation and
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were Included in the proposed anti-inflationary plan dis­
cussed in this study*
The anti-inflationary measures proposed by Professors 
Sumner Sliehter and Alvin Hansen of Harvard University in 
1946 were designed to combat commodity-price inflation with 
direct and selective controls, such as prico regulation, 
consumer credit regulation, and allocation of scarce mater­
ials. The two professors considered voluntary measures 
adequate to retard monetary inflation of the economy* It is 
believed that voluntary measures to retard monetary inflation 
are not applicable to the economy in a country like the United 
States where competition is keen. Consequently, only the 
commodity-price Inflationary measures suggested by Professors 
Sliehter and' Hansen were included in the proposed anti-infla­
tionary plan discussed in this study.
The Federal Reserve System was restricted in its 
capacity to help retard inflation after the end of World War 
II because it was faced with the twofold responsibility oft 
(1) fulfilling its new responsibilities of assuring reason­
able stability in the prices of the large volume of Government 
securities outstanding; and (2) at the same time preventing 
speculative or otherwise excessive expansion of bank credit.
The general Instruments of credit control.of the 
Reserve System could be used only sparingly to assist in
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retarding postwar Inflation* The reserve requirements were 
at their maximum ratios In all districts except the central 
reserve cities, and to raise requirements in these districts 
would have had very little effect upon excess reserves, be­
cause the bulk of reserves and deposits were carried in' 
reserve city and country banks* Changes in the discount 
rates would have h&d little significance in restricting bank 
lending because only a small amount of paper was being dis­
counted at Reserve Banks during the postwar period*
The open market operations of the Reserve Banks 
probably could not have forced contraction of bank lending at 
the beginning of 1946 because approximately 230 billion 
dollars of publicly-held redeemable debt was outstanding 
and the Reserve Banks had been pledged to prevent widely 
fluctuating Interest rates to assure a reasonably stable 
Government security market. Refusal of the Reserve Banks to 
purchase these securities or any attempt to sell additional 
amounts to absorb more bank reserves would have subjected 
the public debt to wide fluctuations in interest rates.
The System during the postwar period made use of its 
power to determine margin requirements for purchasing listed 
corporate securities. It maintained, with some adjustments 
and revisions, Its wartime control over consumer credit, 
until such regulation was ended by legislative action. These
selective measures resulted In a significant contraction In 
'bank'credit for carrying securities, and the expansion of 
consumer credit was restrained somewhat. On th© whole, 
Federal Beserve powers were insufficient to prevent, inflation 
from enveloping the economy during the postwar transition 
period..
The monetary inflationary program proposed in this 
study was designed (1) to decrease the amount of bank-held
Government securities or shift them to less inflationary
\
holders, (2) to keep the cost of carrying the public debt 
as low as possible and at the same time retard debt moneti­
zation, and (3) to reduce or halt the increase of purchasing 
power of Individuals and corporations*
The most important measure to effect a shift of bank- 
held Government securities to less inflationary holders is 
the proposed increase in primary reserve requirements. This 
proposal would have forced member banks in 1946 to sell 
approximately 2,088 million dollars in long-term Government 
securities to the Reserve Banks. This assumed shift of 
securities.from member banks to the less inflationary Reserve 
Bank holdings would also have reduced the degree of multiple 
credit expansion that would have been possible on th© basis 
of the 2,088 million dollar Increase in member bank reserves.
The proposed compulsory savings plan would have
created approximately 4*743 million dollars in treasury 
balances to permit additional retirement of marketable 
Government debt* It is.assumed that approximately 66 per 
cent of the retirement would have come from the holdings of 
commercial banks# ! Therefore, approximately 3,130 million 
dollars' of Government securities would have been retired 
from commercial bank holdings as a result of the proposed 
compulsory savings plan*
The proposed Increase in corporate income tax rates ♦ 
would have increased the yield Of the tax by approximately 
1*445 million dollars* It is assumed that this additional 
revenue would have been used by the Government to retire 
marketable Government securities* of which approximately 
954 million dollars presumably yjouM  have been secured from 
commercial bank holdings*
The proposed anti-inflationary plan thus would have . 
effected retirement, or a shift from commercial banks to less 
Inflationary holders of approximately 6,172 million dollars 
of marketable Government securities during 1946* The reduct­
ion of commercial bank-held securities from 66,962 million 
dollars to 60,790 million is shown on Table tt>, Page &6. Such 
a substantial reduction is considered by the writer to have- 
been adequate to retard or temper inflationary pressures 
during 1946 *
$ able 10# Page $2 shews that the public debt presum­
ably would have been reduced by approximately 1*445 million 
dollars* However# in addition to this reduction, a shift 
would have been accomplished of approximately 6*831 million 
dollars In Government securities from inflationary holders 
to less inflationary holders* namely# the Treasury credit 
and Federal Heserve Banks. Therefore* a total of approxi­
mately 8*276 million dollars of Government securities would 
have been affected by the proposed measures described above. 
(#1*445 million from the increased corporate taxes-%ji #4,743 
million from compulsory savings plan * #2,088 million from 
the increased reserve ,requirements - #8*276 million*) The 
writer believes that this reduction and shift of Government 
securities indicates that a definite restraint of monetary 
inflationary pressures would have been accomplished during 
1946 had these measures been adopted*
In addition* the proposed secondary reserve plan 
would have retarded debt monetization by requiring commercial 
banks to hold a reserve of approximately 18*489 million 
dollars of short-term Government securities against their 
demand deposits. Presumably this would have created a def­
inite market for approximately 18*489 -pillion dollars of the 
total 36,356 million of short-term marketable securities 
issued by the Federal Government. The interest rates would
Ill
have been kept low and the Government security prices 
stabilized.
The compulsory savings plan would have had the addi­
tional anti-inflationary affect of reducing purchasing power 
of individuals during a time of large demand and Inadequate 
supplies. Table 12, Column (4), Page 90 shows that approx­
imately 3*050 million dollars or 64.3 per cent of the total 
4,743 million compulsory savings secured by the Federal 
Government would have been supplied by the 12,000 to §4,000 
income groups, which are believed by the writer to have the. 
'"highest propensity to consume” in the American economy.. It 
is, therefore, concluded that this measure would have tempered 
commodity-price Inflationary pressures during 1946 consider­
ably .
The conclusions drawn from the discussion of anti- 
inflationary measures proposed in this study are that the 
fiscal anti-inflationary program, if .used in conjunction with 
the proposed commodity-price anti-inflationary measures, and 
carried on during the postwar transition period, presumably 
would have restricted the Inflation of the American economy, 
so that the gains in “real income” and the standard of living 
secured by the American people during the defense and war 
periods would have been retained in large part* In other 
words, inflation would have been tempered and retarded*
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